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SYSTEMIC RISK AFTER DODD-FRANKI CONTINGENT
CAPITAL AND THE NEED FOR REGULATORY
STRATEGIES BEYOND OVERSIGHT
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Because the quickest, simplest way for afinancialinstitution to increase
its profitability is to increase its leverage, an enduring tension will exist between regulators and systemically significantfinancial institutions over the
issues of risk and leverage. Many have suggested that the 2008 financial
crisis erupted because flawed systems of executive compensation induced financial institutions to increase leverage and accept undue risk. But that
begs the question why such compensationformulas were adopted. Growing
evidence suggests that shareholdersfavored these formulas to induce managers to accept higher risk and leverage. Shareholderpressure, then, is a factor
that could cause the failure of a systemically significant financial
institution.
What then can be done to prevent future such failures? The DoddFrank Act invests heavily in preventive control and regulatory oversight, but
this Article argues that the political economy offinancial regulation ensures
that there will be an eventual relaxation of regulatory oversight (the regulatory sine curve). Moreover, the Dodd-Frank Act significantly reduces the
ability of financial regulators to effect a bailout of a distressed financial
institution and largely compels them to subject such an institution to aforced
receivership and liquidation under the auspices of the FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation. But the political will to impose such a liquidation remains in doubt, both in the United States and in Europe.
If bailouts are to be ended, something must replace them, beyond relying
on the wisdom of regulators. Because financial institutions are inherently
fragile and liquidity crises predictable, this Article proposes a "bail-in"alternative: namely, a system of "contingent capital"under which, at predefined
points, a significantpercentage of a majorfinancial institution'sdebt securities would convert into an equity security. However, unlike earlierproposals
for contingent capital, the conversion would be on a gradual, incremental
basis, and the debt would convert to a senior, nonconvertiblepreferred stock
with cumulative dividends and voting rights. The intent of this design is
(1) to dilute the equity in a manner that deters excessive risk taking, (2) to
create a class of voting preferred shareholders who would be rationally risk
averse and would resist common shareholderpressurefor increased leverage
and risk taking, and (3) to avoid an "allor nothing" transition,which may
evoke political resistance and bureaucraticindecision, by instead structuring
a more incremental change.
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author
wishes to acknowledge the assistance of his colleagues, including Merritt Fox, Ronald
Gilson, Victor Goldberg, Jeffrey Gordon, Robert Jackson, Alex Raskolnikov, and Charles
Sabel. He is also grateful for research assistance from Ms. Stincy Mary Joseph, Columbia
Law School 2010.
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More generally, in the belief that reliance on enhanced agency oversight
will likely produce an ad hoc and politically contingent system of regulation
(and thus significantdisparities in treatment), this Article recommends, as a
supplementary strategy, the use of objective market-basedbenchmarks that are
embedded in the financial institution'scorporategovernance. It argues that
such controls are less subject to political exigencies and more able to provide
the economic shock absorber and loss absorbency that an effective response to
systemic risk requires.
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SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION
INTRODUCTION

Globally, financial regulators are confronting the problem of systemic risk-namely, the risk that a localized economic shock can have
worldwide repercussions because of the interconnections between financial institutions.1 In 2008, the United States essentially witnessed a localized economic shock in its subprime mortgage market, which nearly
caused the meltdown of worldwide capital markets as that shock was
transmitted through counterparties and global markets with the speed of
a tsunami. Nonetheless, a coherent strategy for dealing with systemic risk
remains lacking.
The responses of financial regulators have been diverse, but generally insufficient. In the United States, reacting to public anger at bailouts,
the Dodd-Frank Act denies regulators the ability to use public funds to
rescue a systemically significant financial institution and invests heavily in
preventive regulation and supervision to prevent a future crisis. 2 New institutions are created to monitor for future shocks and to direct financial
firms to reduce their exposure to systemic crises. 3 This is commendable,
but there is a problem with this approach to crisis prevention: Economic
shocks are rarely predictable. 4 Moreover, they arrive with a suddenness
that often outpaces the capacity of bureaucracies to respond effectively.
Hence, reforms are needed that do not depend upon the oversight capa1. For a fuller definition of systemic risk, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97
Geo. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). The problem is not simply that financial institutions are
interconnected (principally through the over-the-counter derivatives market), but equally
that the risks they face are positively correlated. Uncorrelated risk can be managed
through diversification, but if the risks financial institutions face are correlated, the failure
of one is a strong signal that others are also in trouble. For example, if one financial
institution encounters a liquidity problem and must sell illiquid assets (such as interests in
asset-backed securitizations) into a thin market, this can depress asset prices and force
other banks to write down similar assets on their balance sheets. Thus, the market
rationally responds to the failure of one institution by discounting the stock prices of the
others and ultimately cuts off short-term credit to the entire sector. That was the
experience in 2008 following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.
2. The full title of this statute is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For a fuller
discussion of this statute, see infra notes 82-84, 132-137, and accompanying text.
3. For example, section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC), which is authorized by sections 112 through 115 to oversee
systemic risk. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 111-115 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321-5325).
Section 165 then authorizes the Federal Reserve, either on its own or based on
recommendations from the FSOC, to establish various "prudential standards," including
for "contingent capital," and to specify a minimum required level of contingent capital for
systemically significant financial institutions. Id. § 165 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
4. For similar observations, see Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 3), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670017 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) ("Because economic shocks are generally unpredictable, however, the
[financial regulatory reform] measures enacted are unlikely to be effective against future
crises."); Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 216 ("Any regulation aimed at preventing panics that
trigger systemic risk, however, could fail to anticipate all the causes of these panics.").
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bilities of regulators. Evaluating the most promising alternative strategies
will be the focus of this Article.
Just as generals are prone to plan for the next war by reacting to the
mistakes made in the last war, so do financial regulators, in planning for
future crises, focus (possibly obsessively) on the immediate causes of the
last financial contagion. Unsurprisingly, the Dodd-Frank Act displays a
special concern with executive compensation and authorizes the Federal
Reserve to limit excessive compensation at significant financial institutions.5 In addition, mindful of the slow and extraordinarily costly bankruptcy reorganization of Lehman, 6 the Dodd-Frank Act elaborately designs a new and hopefully expeditious liquidation procedure for a failing
financial institution in order to avoid the delay and uncertainty incident
to a bankruptcy reorganization. Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act confers
"resolution authority" on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) to impose a receivership on a failing financial institution in order
to achieve an "orderly liquidation" without the investment of public
funds. 7 These twin concerns-restricting executive compensation and
liquidating a failing financial firm quickly without a taxpayer-financed
bailout-reflect two key judgments that dominated the legislative process
leading up to the Dodd-Frank's enactment. These are:
(1) that the 2008 financial crisis was in substantial part the consequence of flawed executive compensation formulas that gave senior financial managers at major financial institutions perverse incentives to
pursue short-term profits by accepting risk and high leverage8 ; and
(2) that the market's perception that some financial institutions were
"too big to fail" enabled these firms to obtain capital at a discounted price
commensurate with the market's judgment that they would be bailed out.
5. Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes federal banking and securities
regulators to adopt rules restricting the ability of executive officers, employees, or directors
of "covered financial institutions" to receive "excessive compensation, fees, or benefits" or
compensation that "could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial
institution." The term "covered financial" includes most financial institutions (banks,
investment banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, etc.) that have assets in excess of $1
billion. Dodd-Frank Act § 956 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641).
6. The administrative costs (mainly advisory and legal fees) of the still continuing
bankruptcy reorganization of Lehman Brothers had already climbed to $982 million as of
September 2010. Liz Moyer, Lehman's Bankruptcy: Tab Is Close to $1 Billion, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 19, 2010, at C2. This reorganization is probably still at an early stage.
7. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress authorized the FDIC to impose a receivership
on a failing financial firm that will result in the firm's "orderly liquidation." The goal of
this legislation is that any losses resulting from liquidation will be imposed on unsecured
creditors and shareholders, not the taxpaying public. See Dodd-Frank Act tit. II,
§§ 201-217 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394) ("Orderly Liquidation Authority").
8. For a representative statement (by a major economist), see Alan S. Blinder, Crazy
Compensation and the Crisis, Wall St. J., May 28, 2009, at A15 (describing executive
compensation formulas as one of the "most fundamental causes" of the crisis). For the
more general argument that executive compensation formulas gave rise to a moral hazard
problem, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay,
98 Geo. L.J. 247 (2010).
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This discount in turn encouraged these firms to take on excessive
leverage. 9
Neither of these premises is wrong, but the Dodd-Frank Act's response to them may misperceive the problem for two basic reasons.
First, executive compensation formulas may well have incentivized
managers to accept excessive risk, but this shift toward greater risk occurred not because managers overreached shareholders, but rather because some shareholders used executive compensation as a means of inducing managers to accept higher levels of risk and leverage that they
would otherwise have resisted. Flawed executive compensation was more
an effect than a cause, with shareholders being more instigators than victims. Because shareholders are generally diversified, they have far greater
willingness to tolerate risk (and to pressure for increased leverage) than
do undiversified managers. From a policy perspective, then, countervailing pressure must be structured into the corporate governance of systemically significant financial institutions to curb this incentive.
Over the short run, the quickest way for a financial institution to
increase its profitability is to increase its leverage. Because many institutional shareholders must compete for investors' funds, they may pursue
wealth maximization strategies more aggressively than other shareholders
(and hence may tolerate more externality-creating behavior, including
higher leverage). A key implication here is that the level of risk that is
privately optimal for the shareholders of a financial institution may not
be socially optimal. Accordingly, shareholder pressure that heightens systemic risk should be seen less as a private problem of governance and
more as a public problem of externalities.
Second, although the Dodd-Frank Act properly recognizes that the
"too big to fail" phenomenon generates a "moral hazard" problem, one
cannot respond to that problem in the manner of King Canute and simply order that there be no more failures. Nor can one realistically expect
that all future failures will be carefully managed under governmental supervision (as Dodd-Frank's "resolution authority" provisions seem to assume). Rather, public policy must recognize the plausibility of the "falling dominoes" scenario under which the first financial firm to fail sets off
9. The following summary reflects the consensus view of the "too big to fail"
phenomenon:
Explicit or implicit government guarantees immunize the banks' creditors against
the consequences of a default by the bank. As a result, the default risk premium
in the interest rates demanded by the banks' creditors is lower and may even be
zero. Institutions that benefit from such guarantees, e.g., institutions that are
deemed to be "too big to fail," are therefore able to borrow at lower interest rates.
The savings in capital costs that are thereby achieved are . . . larger the more
leverage the bank has.
Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital
Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive 19 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at
Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1669704 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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a cascade of successive failures. In response, it must seek to counteract
the pressures that lead financial firms to take on high risk and leverage.
Here, many economists believe that the market's perception that some
financial institutions were "too big to fail" (and would therefore be bailed
out with public funds) resulted in an unintended subsidy for these institutions because their creditors charged them less for capital than their true
risk level justified. 10 As a result, because capital was cheap to them, these
firms (and their shareholders) were incentivized to take on excessive
leverage.
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress responded to this implicit subsidy
by insisting that future public bailouts by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC
were forbidden. To this end, regulators were stripped of their former
authority to advance funds to major financial institutions facing a liquidity crisis. 11 Yet it is still not clear that the market really believes that any
future administration could truly tolerate a major bank failure, and many
suspect that some means would be found to evade statutory obstacles in a
major crisis. Nor can it be assumed that a future administration would
have the political fortitude to liquidate a failing financial institution if to
do so would suggest a failure of oversight on its part. Even among experienced practitioners, uncertainty surrounds what would actually happen
the next time a major liquidity crisis erupts and a significant financial
institution nears insolvency. 12 As a result, the market may still consider
some banks protected, and hence, the "too big to fail" subsidy would not
have been effectively ended.
An alternative regulatory approach, favored by many and consistent
with modem law and economics scholarship, would respond to this problem of the "too big to fail" subsidy by taxing the beneficiaries of this subsidy (i.e., the major banks).13 In principle, such a "bank tax" would offset
the implicit subsidy and thus reduce the incentive to take on excessive
leverage, while also funding a private insurance system to bail out the
failing bank.1 4 Presumably with these objectives in mind, the
10. See, e.g., id.
11. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
12. This author has had this conversation with a number of banking and securities law
practitioners, and most believe the Federal Reserve both could and would find ways to skirt
statutory obstacles in a major crisis. Some of them emphasize that few would have standing
to challenge unauthorized lending by the Federal Reserve. On the other side of this
debate, it can be argued that the Federal Reserve has received intense criticism and
"second guessing" from Congress since 2008 and has to fear that any evasion of Congress's
restrictions on its lending authority could lead to loss of its autonomy. Hence, it is highly
speculative as to whether and how far the Federal Reserve would dare to bend the law.
13. Put simply, law and economics scholars favor a policy of responding to
externalities by taxing them. See Heinz K6hler, Microeconomics 511 (1992); see also E.IR
Hunt, History of Economic Thought: A Critical Perspective 390-95 (2d ed. 2002)
(criticizing this solution). In principle, this tax should force the firm to internalize the
costs that it is imposing on society.
14. For an in depth examination of such a proposal (and a critique of the Dodd-Frank
Act), see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis:
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International Monetary Fund has consistently advocated a bank tax that
would "pre-fund" a private global emergency fund that could bail out a
threatened systemically significant financial institution. 15 In effect, three
birds are killed with one stone by such a strategy, as such a private, industry-funded bailout fund would (1) prevent the first domino from falling
and thus avert a financial contagion, (2) reduce the current incentives for
financial institutions to use excessive leverage, and (3) rely upon a private
insurance system, rather than a taxpayer-funded bailout.
Still, desirable as such a policy sounds, it may be too good to be true.
First, it may be infeasible because the private bailout fund concept has
proven to be politically toxic. 1 6 Late in the drafting of Dodd-Frank, the
Conference Committee struck proposals for any such private bailout fund
from the final legislation. 17 To an angry public, any suggestion of further
bailouts of failed financial institutions has been unacceptable. Second,
and even more critical, it is doubtful that such a private insurance fund
would be large enough to deal with a true systemic crisis. Properly understood, systemic risk involves notjust the risk that the failure of one institution could set off a cascade of failures because of interconnections, but
also the likelihood that the risks faced by financial institutions are closely
correlated. 18 Given high correlation, the failure of one institution implies that all institutions facing correlated risks will face a similar crisis.
Insurance cannot solve such an industry-wide problem because no indus-

Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 Yale J.
on Reg. (forthcoming Winter 2011) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Of course, the
idea of such a private insurance fund funded by the relevant industry is not new and
provided the rationale for both the FDIC and the Securities Insurance Protection
Corporation, which protect depositors and investors from the failure of banks and brokers,
respectively.
15. The International Monetary Fund has proposed a levy on banks-known as a
"financial stability contribution"-to generate a self insurance fund equivalent to 4-5% of
each country's GDP; this fund would total around $1-2 trillion. See Linda Yueh, IMF Gets
Tough on Banks with 'FAT' Levy, Guardian (London), Apr. 21, 2010, at http://
(on file with the
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/21/imf-levy-bank-fat-tax
Columbia Law Review).
16. The idea of such a bank tax is controversial not only in the United States, but in
Europe as well. See Alistair Dawber, EU Finance Ministers Fail to Agree Deal on Bank Tax;
UK and EU Finance Chiefs at Loggerheads over How to Use the Proceeds of a Levy, The
Independent (London), Apr. 19, 2010, at 38 (reporting disagreements at meeting of EU
Finance Ministers).
17. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 14 (manuscript at 41) (discussing House bill's
"Systemic Dissolution Fund" of $150 billion and Senate bill's "Orderly Liquidation Fund,"
both of which were to be "pre-funded" through risk-based assessments of major financial
institutions and both of which were deleted at the Conference Committee stage).
18. See supra note 1. Thus, although it is commonly said that major financial
institutions are "too big to fail," it is more accurate to say that they are "too correlated to
fail."
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try-funded insurance fund could ever be sufficient to insure against much
of the industry's failure. 19
Critics of such a fund further argue that the very existence of a private bailout fund might encourage "complacency" on the part of the insured banks, with the result that investors might again favor excessive leverage. 20 If that were the case, the same moral hazard problem would
surface in a new form, and externalities would again result. Finally, a
private bailout fund does not adequately respond to the problem of
shareholder pressure and may even aggravate it.2 1 For these reasons, a
private bailout fund may be part of the answer, but it cannot be the entire
answer.
Constrained by political realities and public anger, the Dodd-Frank
Act's basic approach to the problem of systemic risk was to curtail public
lending authority and instead mandate active regulatory monitoring and
oversight. Although greater regulatory oversight is certainly desirable,
this Article will argue that exclusive reliance upon it is unrealistic. Because of a variety of factors-the inherent fragility of financial institutions, the interconnections among them, the closely correlated risks that
they face, and the political economy of financial regulation-it is, unfortunately, predictable that serious problems capable of generating a systemic crisis will not be detected in advance or will elicit only an inade19. This is definitional. Insurance systems work based on an assumed (often
actuarially calculated) level of risk. If some significant percentage of the industry will need
protection, the size of such a fund begins to approach a significant percentage of the assets
of the industry. Put more simply, a private bailout fund might be able to deal with a
Lehman-sized failure, but not a failure by both Citigroup and Bank of America. But that
could happen if the risks they faced were highly correlated.
20. See Yueh, supra note 15 (noting a key objection to bank tax was that it would
encourage complacency on the part of insured banks). This complacency could result in
part from the belief that, if the private fund were inadequate, it would need to be
supplemented by public funds. Even if public funds were not made available and
bankruptcies resulted, then costs would again be visited on society. Others see a greater
problem: that such a bank levy "would reinforce the link between banks and governments"
and would continue to convince creditors that large banks would not be permitted to fail.
Robert Cyran et al., The Time Is Right for Breaking Up, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2011, at B2.
21. Even in the case of ordinary industrial corporations, activist shareholders regularly
pressure for increased leverage. The best recent example may be William Ackman and
Pershing Square Capital Management's 2009 proxy fight for Target Corporation. Ackman
and his hedge fund sought to induce Target to sell its real estate assets and employ a sale
leaseback strategy that would have increased the firm's leverage. Zachary Kouwe, A Fund
Manager Wins, and Moves On, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2009, at B4. Although his proxy fight
failed (possibly because early 2009 was the low point of the recent recession), the contest
was representative of recent activist campaigns. The relevant point here is that because
these nonfinancial companies that Mr. Ackman has repeatedly targeted are not "too big to
fail" and do not receive an interest rate subsidy based on investor expectations of a bailout,
eliminating the "too big to fail" subsidy will not alone eliminate shareholder pressure for
increased leverage. That pressure may come in part from the fact that diversified
shareholders are willing to tolerate more risk than undiversified managers. Given the
existence of a private insurance fund, shareholders may find it even easier to pressure
managers because the prospect of firm failure is reduced.
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quate response. If ex ante preventive regulation is likely to fail (at least
eventually), and if banking regulators are stripped of their authority to
advance funds to troubled financial firms ex post (as the Dodd-Frank Act
has largely done),22 the result could be a financial catastrophe worse than
the 2008 crisis.
What, then, can be done to avert a future systemic crisis? Although
every commentator today has a pet theory of what caused the 2008 crisis
and a proposed reform, this Article will argue that, whatever the causes of
that crisis, the principal public policy objective must be to make the financial system more resilient to localized economic shocks so that a crisis
at one financial firm cannot generate a cascading series of failures. To
create such a buffer that prevents the failure of one significant firm from
carrying its interconnected or risk-correlated peers down with it, this
Article proposes that we build loss absorbency into the capital structure
of systemically significant financial institutions. The simplest means to
that end is through a corporate finance innovation-known as "contingent capital"-that has both strong advocates and skeptical critics.
Among the former are the Swiss Government, 23 the Association for
Financial Markets in Europe (AFME),24 Canada's principal bank regula-

22. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
23. Switzerland has a unique version of the "too big to fail" problem; almost uniquely,
it has financial institutions that are "too big to be saved." Collectively, UBS and Credit
Suisse dwarf the Swiss economy and could not be bailed out with public funds. Elena
Logutenkova & Klaus Wille, UBS, Credit Suisse May Need to Boost Capital to 19%,
Bloomberg, Oct. 4, 2010, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-04/ubs-credit(on file with the
suisse-must-boost-capital-to-meet-swiss-regulator-requirements.html
Columbia Law Review) ("The two banks' total assets of 2.6 trillion Swiss francs ($2.64
trillion) are more than four times the size of the Swiss economy."). As a result, the Swiss
have prudently adopted higher capital requirements that are well in excess of Basel III's
new enhanced standards. In addition to a high core capital requirement equal to 7% of
risk-adjusted assets, Swiss banks will be required to maintain an additional and larger layer
of contingent capital. First Mover: Regulating Swiss Banks, Economist, Oct. 9, 2010, at 107
[hereinafter First Mover]; High Hopes for CoCos, But the Debate Rages On, Euroweek,
Nov. 12, 2010 [hereinafter EuroWeek, High Hopes], available at 2010 WLNR 23710197
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also infra notes 91, 138, and accompanying text
(describing Swiss regulations).
24. See Mark Austen, Too Big to Be Bailed Out: There Is a Way to Rescue Banking
Giants and the Economy Without Making the Taxpayer Cough Up, The Guardian
(London), Aug. 17, 2010, at 26 (statement by Acting Chief Executive of AFME endorsing
contingent capital requirement for banks).

804

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:795

tors, 25 the Squam Lake Working Group, 26 the Financial Stability Board
27
(FSB), and, probably, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
On the other side of the debate, some academic critics contend that contingent capital is an overly complex substitute for simply requiring the
infusion of more equity capital into systemically significant financial
28
institutions.
This debate will and must continue, in part because the potential
scale of near-term issuances of contingent capital is ballooning exponentially. Standard and Poor's (S&P), the rating agency, has recently estimated that worldwide issuances by banks of contingent capital might have
25. Canada's Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) has
announced a policy of requiring all subordinated debt issued by financial institutions
under its jurisdiction to contain a conversion provision under which the debt will convert
into equity under specified circumstances of financial distress. Blair W. Keefe, Canada
Pushes Embedded Contingent Capital, 29 Nat'l Banking L. Rev. 57, 57-58 (2010). The
Bank of Canada (Canada's central bank) has reacted favorably to this plan. See Banks
Should Shoulder Future Losses, Carney Says; Bank of Canada Backs Changes To Avert
Bailouts, Toronto Star, Nov. 10, 2010, at B3 (reporting statements by Governor of Bank of
Canada).
26. Kenneth R. French et al., The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System
66-74 (2010). The Squam Lake Working Group includes a collection of prominent
financial economists from major universities and elsewhere.
27. See Fin. Stability Board, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically
Important Financial Institutions: FSB Recommendations and Time Lines 3 (2011),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (listing "a quantitative requirement for contingent capital
instruments" among recommended measures to improve stability of systemically important
financial institutions); Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Group of
Governors and Heads of Supervision Announce Higher Global Minimum Capital
Standards 2 (Sept. 12, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p00912.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) ("The Basel Committee and the FSB are developing a well
integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include
combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt."); see also Damian
Paletta, Idea to Prevent Next Banking Bust?, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 2010, at A2 (reporting
support of Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein).
28. For the view that contingent capital (as presently designed) serves mainly to
preserve tax-advantaged financing and is an inferior policy to requiring greater equity
capital, see Admati et al., supra note 9, at 45-49. These authors further contend that the
financial industry is attracted to proposals for contingent capital because they view it as a
way of preserving the tax advantages of debt financing (whereas the use of equity capital is
viewed by the industry as too expensive). Id. at 47-48. Their position relies heavily on the
famous theorem of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller that a firm's value is
independent of its capital structure. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost
of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261,
288-93 (1958). Although the M&M view posits the irrelevance of capital structure and the
choice between debt and equity, proponents of greater use of equity in banks' capital
structure argue only a corollary of the M&M theorem: namely, that equity is not more
expensive than debt. The M&M theorem rests on very stylized facts and assumptions and
ignores the impact of taxation (which favors the use of debt securities). Another problem
with this academic preference for the greater use of equity is that such a requirement
might induce banks to restrict lending in order to redeem and retire debt, thereby
reducing liquidity and chilling growth. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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to exceed $1 trillion over the next five to ten years simply to comply with
new, stricter rules for bank capital. 29 That is a staggering estimate, but it
also highlights the extraordinary fact that there is still little agreement on
the design or purposes of this new security. To most, the term "contingent capital" means a convertible debt security that systemically significant financial institutions would issue and that would automatically convert into equity at one or more predefined trigger points when the
particular financial institution experienced financial stress. By definition,
such a conversion averts default, bankruptcy, and interconnected financial failures-advantages that have also motivated legislative interest in
30
contingent capital.
But this description only sketches a cursory outline of the security
and ignores important choices in its design. What else should the design
of contingent capital include? As this Article argues, contingent capital
can also be structured (1) to curb shareholder pressure for risk and leverage, (2) to create a new voting constituency to counterbalance equity
shareholders, (3) to supplement subjective regulatory assessments of financial institutions' soundness with a more objective and market-based
29. See Banks May Need to Raise USD1 Trillion, Bus. World, Dec. 9, 2010, at
http://www.businessworld.ie/livenews.htm?a=2702185;s=rollingnews.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (summarizing S&P report and noting that investor acceptance of the
new security was, in S&P's judgment, still an open question); Who Will Buy CoCos?,
Banking Newslink, Dec. 21, 2010 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing S&P
report). Credit Suisse has announced an intention to make major issuances of contingent
capital, possibly as much as $30 billion. See Justin Baer & Francesco Guerrera, Credit
Suisse Plans Early CoCo Moves, Fin. Times (London), Dec. 13, 2010, at 1. Barclays, which
ironically purchased much of Lehman Brothers's assets, is attracting even greater attention
as it implements a plan to use contingent capital to pay executive bonuses. See Francesco
Guerrera et al., Big Banks Keep Close Watch on Barclays' Cocos-for-Bonuses Plan, Fin.
Times (London),Jan. 31, 2011, at 1; see also Steve Dinneen, Barclays Hopes Its New CoCo
Will Prove a Hit with Investors, City A.M. (London), Nov. 16, 2010, available at http://
www.cityam.com/news-and-analysis/barclays-hopes-its-new-coco-will-prove-hit-investors (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Barclays is "experimenting with" a contingent
convertible that would "not only convert to equity if the bank's capital ratio declined, but
convert back again if things improved"). Overall, it appears that some $6 billion of
"reverse convertible" bonds were sold by banks during 2010. Zeke Faux, Wall Street Turns
Stock Gains into Investor Losses with Structured Notes, Bloomberg, Jan. 5, 2011, at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-06/wall-street-turns-stock-gains-into-investor-losseswith-structured-notes.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
30. For precisely this reason, the Dodd-Frank Act instructs the FSOC to "make
recommendations to the [Federal Reserve] Board of Governors concerning the
establishment of heightened prudential standards for ... contingent capital," Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 112(a) (2) (I), 115(b)(1)(F), 124 Stat. 1376, 1395, 1403 (2010) (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5322, 5325) (emphasis added), and authorizes the Board to adopt such
prudential standards, id. § 165(b) (1) (B) (i) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
The Act also requires the FSOC to report to Congress and the Federal Reserve Board
on the feasibility of a contingent capital requirement, id. § 115(c) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5325), and authorizes the Board, subsequent to the receipt of this report, to adopt
such a requirement, id. § 165(c) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). See also infra notes
132-137 and accompanying text.
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standard, and (4) to reduce the need to rely on regulators' willingness to
take decisive action in a politically challenging environment. In contrast,
simply requiring the greater use of equity in the capital structure of financial institutions (as the critics of contingent capital prefer) cannot
achieve these same objectives and may require banks to reduce their level
31
of lending.
Properly designed, contingent capital can do precisely what the private bailout fund cannot do. Not only can it prevent the fall of the first
interconnected domino (as can the private bailout fund), but it also protects against the danger that systemically significant financial institutions
may face highly correlated risks. Under this high correlation scenario, a
private bailout fund would likely be quickly exhausted. But contingent
capital builds loss absorbency into each systemically significant firm's capital structure, so that the industry can survive, even if multiple firms are
affected. To be sure, such firms would likely have to pay a higher interest
rate on such a contingently convertible debt security to market it, but this
actually has the hidden advantage of creating a functional equivalent to
the IMF's "bank tax." That is, the likely higher interest rate paid by the
issuer on contingent capital at least partially offsets the implicit subsidy
that "too big to fail" banks otherwise enjoy. Further, contingent capital is
less subject to the danger that regulators, because of political or legal
controversies, will fail to intervene. In essence, a preplanned contract
replaces the bankruptcy process and thus does not depend on regulators
properly exercising their resolution authority.
Important as all these potential advantages are, an even greater advantage may be that contingent capital can be designed to address the
key factor that may lead issuers to take on excessive leverage: namely,
shareholder pressure. To this end, this Article proposes a design for contingent capital that deviates from earlier proposals in two significant ways:
(1) The conversion ratio would be deliberately designed to protect the
debt holders from loss by instead diluting the existing equity holders, and
(2) the debt security would convert into a fixed return preferred stock
with cumulative arrearages and significant voting rights. Because the new
preferred stock would have only a limited, fixed return and would not
share in the firm's residual earnings, the interests of the preferred stockholders would be naturally aligned with those of the firm's debt holders.
These preferred shareholders would be rationally risk averse, and they
would have significant voting rights. The goal behind this use of preferred stock is to create a countervailing voting constituency to offset the
voting power of risk-tolerant common shareholders, thereby reducing the
pressure on corporate managers to accept greater risk and leverage.
31. If regulators require a higher ratio of equity to total assets, financial institutions
may be compelled to reduce their liabilities by redeeming or retiring debt. Reducing
outstanding liabilities would lower their level of leverage, but would likely also imply lower
lending levels, which could curtail economic expansion and recovery over an interim
period.
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So designed, it would not be necessary that a conversion of the debt
security actually occur for contingent capital to have a disciplining impact
on the common shareholders and deter excessive risk taking. If, as later
proposed, conversion were to occur at several, incremental stages as prescribed contingencies occurred, the market would understand that, at
these clearly defined trigger points, conversion would become mandatory
and would dilute both the common shareholders' cash flow and voting
rights. Thus, as the issuer approached these trigger points, the market
would recognize that wealth transfers from the common shareholders to
the contingent debt holders were probable and would discount the market price of the issuer's common stock. Even if the market (and common
shareholders) might otherwise favor increased leverage, this risk of the
common stock's dilution on conversion of the debt security should counterbalance that pressure. The key here is to design an early trigger, so
that increased leverage carries a cost for shareholders from an early
point.
Because shareholder pressure is at the center of this explanation for
why financial institutions failed in 2008, it is important to stress at the
outset the differences between the foregoing account of the 2008 crisis
and the more conventional story. In the standard story, managers are
assumed to have overreached more cautious and prudent shareholders
because the incentives of managers were geared to the short term and
toward risk preference as the result of compensation formulas that they
designed.3 2 This overstates. In truth, shareholder pressure usually influences managerial preferences, and modern corporate governance has increasingly reduced the "agency costs" that once enabled managers to resist or disdain shareholder pressure. As discussed below, the more
"shareholder friendly" the firm's corporate governance system, the less
attention is likely to be paid to externalities, and the greater the exposure
33
to volatility and systemic risk.
34
In contrast to shareholders, managers tend to be more risk averse.
This is both because they (1) face greater legal and reputational risks
from a corporate failure than do shareholders, and (2) suffer more economically from a failure because managers, almost by definition, are undiversified and tend to have significant firm-specific capital invested in
their firms. This claim is hardly new. Indeed, a well-known literature in
32. For basically such an account, see Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 8, at 255-74;
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns
and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 257, 261 (2010).
33. For empirical evidence supporting this proposition, see infra notes 41-49 and
accompanying text.
34. This is traditionally cited as one reason that managers resist takeovers and "going
private" transactions, which involve greater leverage. I have explored this theme at length
elsewhere. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (1986) (noting "managers [are] more risk averse
than their shareholders" and that consequently, "leverage ... is something that managers
avoid").
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corporate finance has argued that managers tend to hoard "free cash
flow" (i.e., cash that could be used for shareholder distributions) and
35
have historically resisted shareholder pressure for greater dividends.
Inefficient as such "free cash flow" hoarding may be in the general corporate context, it could be more desirable in the case of major financial
institutions because it implies increased capital reserves and thus reduces
the risk of a major bankruptcy that might set off a cascade of interconnected financial failures.
The roadmap for this Article follows from these linked contentions
that (1) shareholder pressure must be reduced at systemically significant
financial institutions, and (2) traditional "safety and soundness" regulation will predictably fail at some point. Part I examines the impact of
shareholder pressure as the force most logically explaining the shift toward excessive risk taking and leverage at financial firms. Although this
pressure exists at all corporations, it seems more intense at large financial
firms where shareholders rationally want their managements to exploit
the opportunity to borrow at below-market interest rates because of the
market's perception that these firms are "too big to fail." Part II turns to
the political economy of financial regulation and the predictability of a
future systemic failure. It posits the inevitability of a "regulatory sine
curve" under which regulatory activism, while intense in the wake of a
regulatory crisis, relaxes thereafter, as lobbying and the impact of regulatory arbitrage soften the resistance of regulators. From this premise, and
the premise that liquidity crises are endemic to banking, it follows that to
the extent that we strip regulators of the power to advance funds to banks
caught in such a liquidity crisis (as the Dodd-Frank Act does), we must
find some substitute that insulates the financial system so that a local
shock cannot cause a financial panic.
Part III then turns to this Article's preferred strategy-the
mandatory use of contingent capital-and explains that its greatest
strength is that it can work even when regulatory oversight fails and a
crisis sneaks in under the regulators' radar screen (as it always has in the
past). Contingent capital is not presented as a panacea or as an adequate
remedy by itself, but more as a failsafe, supplementary protection. If we
recognize both that some regulatory failures are inevitable and that the
interconnections among financial firms may lock the financial industry
into a downward spiral if any major firm fails, such a failsafe option seems
a prudent necessity.
A final and even deeper premise of this Article is that, in the case of
major financial institutions, governance arrangements cannot be simply
the product of private negotiations among shareholders, managers, and
other corporate constituencies. Private optimality and social optimality
35. This literature begins with Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 323 (1986). Of
course, the ability to hoard "free cash flow" declined as corporate governance became
more shareholder-friendly.
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diverge. Banks are different-because the public inevitably stands behind them as their guarantors of last resort. Systemic risk is in truth but
one form of the classic externality problem. Pollution is the classic example of an externality, as the polluting firm does not bear the full social
costs that it creates. By definition, systemic risk similarly involves costs
36
that are externalized by the firm and fall instead on society.
Nonetheless, the proposals advanced here are conservatively designed to give creditors voting power only once the corporation enters
the "vicinity of insolvency,"3 7 and they do not generally seek to override
the shareholders' power to determine corporate policy. Because creditors are by no means the champions of economic efficiency, voting power
is conferred on them only in limited circumstances as the least restrictive
alternative by which to mitigate the potential externalities that arise in a
world of deeply interconnected financial institutions and markets.
I. THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF SHAREHOLDER

PRESSURE

The conventional story of the 2008 crisis-as best told by Professor
Lucian Bebchuk and his coauthors 38 -focuses on the perverse influence
of executive compensation. They argue not only that executive pay packages were excessively focused on short-term results, but that because senior executives' compensation packages were closely tied to highly
levered bets on the value of the banks' assets, such executives shared in
any shareholder gains but were insulated from shareholder losses. 39
Hence, executives could focus on the upside and ignore the downside of
any risky strategy. The result, they argue, is a classic moral hazard
problem.
To corroborate their claim, Bebchuk and his coauthors have collected data showing that senior managers appeared to have profited
handsomely even when shareholders lost virtually everything. Examining
the failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman, they find that the top five exec36. The core idea underlying systemic risk is that one failure induces others. Of
course, the individual firm bears some of the costs, but not all (even when it does not fail).
For example, when a distressed financial institution dumps illiquid assets (such as a
portfolio of asset-backed securitizations) on a thin market in order to raise capital, it
depresses the value of similar assets and hence reduces the market value of other financial
institutions that have invested similarly. This is an example of the consequences of
financial institutions facing highly correlated risks. See supra note 1. And if its own
bankruptcy causes other failures (or necessitates public bailouts of other firms, as
Lehman's failure arguably did), then it also imposes broader costs on society. These costs
fall on parties other than shareholders.
37. This phrase, used by Chancellor William Allen in Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), has long served as a shorthand term for the undeniable
economic fact that shareholders have perverse incentives to take high risk (at the expense
of creditors) when their corporation is on the doorsteps of insolvency.
38. See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 8; Bebchuk et al., supra note 32.
39. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 8, at 249-50.
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utives at each firm cashed out extraordinary amounts of performancebased compensation during the 2000-2008 period. Specifically, they estimate that these top five management teams derived $1.4 billion and $1
billion, respectively, from cash bonuses and equity sales during this period. 40 These amounts substantially exceeded the same executives' stock
holdings at the beginning of the period. If managers win when shareholders lose, this finding would seem to confirm Bebchuk's moral hazard
diagnosis.
Their research has not, however, gone unchallenged. In particular,
Rene Stulz has coauthored several papers that dispute this thesis that the
executive compensation formulas for senior executives at financial institutions drove the 2008 crisis by creating an excessive incentive to accept
risk. 4 1 In one paper, he and a coauthor find evidence that those banks
with chief executive officers (CEOs) whose incentives were better aligned
42
with their shareholders actually performed worse during the crisis.
They suggest that "CEOs with better incentives to maximize shareholder
wealth took risks that other CEOs did not."48 Nor do they find that bank
CEOs reduced their stock holdings prior to 2008; hence, they suffered
large wealth losses along with the shareholders. 4 4 In short, little evidence
supports the claim that shareholders were being overreached by their
CEOs.
In another study, Stulz and a coauthor find that banks with "shareholder-friendly" corporate governance performed worse during the 2008
crisis. 45 Indeed, banks that the market had favored in 2006 had especially
poor returns during the crisis. 46 In other words, financial institutions
that led the market in 2006 encountered disaster in 2008. In contrast,
financial institutions that had seemed stodgy and unresponsive to shareholder desires in 2006 experienced the fewest losses in 2008. Such findings are at least consistent with the view that shareholder pressure led
managers to take on higher leverage and accept greater risk in the boom
40. Bebchuk et al., supra note 32, at 261.
41. Andrea Beltratti & Rene M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During
the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 254/2009, 2009),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1433502 (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
Rfidiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis (The
Ohio State Univ. Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2009), available at http:/
/www.ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
42. See Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 41, at 1-2 (arguing most plausible
explanation for these findings is CEOs "took actions that they believed the market would
welcome," but "[e]x post, these actions were costly to their banks").
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 2, 4.
45. Beltratti & Stulz, supra note 41, at 3.
46. Id. at 2. Banks that performed in the worst quartile of performance during the
2008 crisis had average returns of -87.44% during the crisis, but an average return of
+33.07% in 2006. The best performing banks during the crisis had average returns of
-16.58% during the crisis, but only average returns of +7.80% in 2006. Id. at 14.
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years-with catastrophic consequences later in 2008. Shareholders in effect opted for a financial roller coaster, and the firms they controlled
soared to record peaks and plunged to deep valleys in rapid succession.
Other studies by different teams of researchers have reached similar
conclusions. Gropp and K6hler find that "owner controlled" banks had
higher profits in the years before the 2008 crisis in comparison to "manager controlled" banks, but experienced larger losses and were more
likely to require governmental assistance during the 2008 crisis. 47 Using
a sample of 296 firms from thirty countries, Erkens, Hung, and Matos
show that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional
ownership experienced worse stock returns during the 2007-2008 crisis. 48 Specifically, they found that firms with higher institutional ownership took "greater risk in their investment policies before the onset of the
crisis." 49 Such evidence suggests that even if managers would prefer to
avoid high risk and leverage, their preferences can be overridden by
shareholders, and that institutional investors in particular can compel
firms to accept greater risk and thus cause them to suffer worse losses in a
crisis.
Does this research disprove the claims of Bebchuk and his colleagues? That is not this Article's contention. Bebchuk and his coauthors
argue that the pay formulas used to compensate senior management at
banks gave them an excessive incentive to accept risk. But such an increased incentive could be exactly what shareholders wanted. Shareholders have long used executive compensation to align managerial preferences with their own, and institutional investors certainly understand that
managers are undiversified and thus risk averse about corporate insolvency. To "correct" this tendency, shareholders could have been willing
to accept even imperfect compensation formulas to seduce managers into
accepting increased risk. Thus, both sides in this debate could have valid
points. Bebchuk and company could be correct that compensation formulas create excessive incentives for bank managers to engage in risky
activities, and Stulz and others can legitimately interpret their own data
to mean that shareholder-controlled firms accept higher risk and hence
are more prone to failure in a crisis than firms in which managers are
free to enjoy the quiet life (and so avoid risk). Rather than managers
overreaching shareholders, it looks instead as if manager incentives have
been at least crudely aligned with those of their shareholders by these
compensation formulas. Under this synthesis, shareholders, as princi47. Reint Gropp and Matthias K6hler, Bank Owners or Bank Managers: Who is Keen
on Risk? Evidence from the Financial Crisis 21 (European Bus. Sch., Research Paper No.
10-02, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1555663 (on file with the Columbia Law

Review).
48. David Erkens, Mingyi Hung & Pedro Matos, Corporate Governance in the
2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide 2 (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 249/2009, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397685 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
49. Id.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:795

pals, simply found ways to contract with managers, as their agents, to accept greater risk through lucrative compensation formulas.
But that only brings us back to the centrality of shareholder pressure
and the gap in bank governance between what is privately optimal and
what is socially optimal. Arguably, shareholders of financial institutions
were willing to accept high leverage and risk, not simply because they
were diversified, but because they believed that (1) major banks were either "too big to fail" or "too interconnected to fail," and (2) the implicit
reduction in interest expense charged to "too big to fail" banks created
an opportunity for "cheap" capital that could not be spurned. Based on
these expectations, shareholders of major financial institutions could rationally pressure management to accept more risk than shareholders
might consider advisable at industrial corporations.
At this point, it is necessary to disaggregate shareholders. Individual
shareholders may sometimes also be risk averse and disinclined to pressure management toward greater risk and leverage, but they are a decreasing minority of all shareholders.50 Not only do institutional investors own a majority of the equity in U.S. public corporations, but their
level of ownership rises to 73% when we focus on the top 1,000 U.S. corporations (among which large financial institutions easily rank) .51 Mutual funds now represent the largest category of institutional owner (in
terms of equity holdings) .52 Their rise is important because, in comparison to pension funds, mutual funds more actively compete for the investor's favor, and their recent investment returns are likely to heavily influence this competition. Hence, they tend to be more proactive investors.
Historically, pension funds were largely indexed investors, holding
large portfolios that mimicked the broader market. Thus, they were disinclined to become involved in individual corporate governance disputes
because they could not profit significantly from them.5 3 But this is changing. Increasingly, pension funds are investing their stock portfolios in
hedge funds to obtain returns superior to simple indexing. 54 In turn,
50. Recent estimates find retail (or individual) shareholders own only roughly 25% of
the stock in publicly traded firms, with the balance being owned by institutional investors
and foreign investors (who are also largely institutions). Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public:
Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, 3 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 245, 262
tbl.1 (2009). Since 2001, institutional investors have held over 50% of the total
outstanding equity in U.S. public corporations. The Conference Bd., The 2010
Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition 22
(2010).
51. See The Conference Bd., supra note 50, at 27 chart 14 (showing this percentage
to have been 76.4% in 2007 and 73% in 2009).
52. Id. at 24-26 & tbl.12 (showing mutual funds held 20.9% of the total equity market
in 2009, slightly more than pension funds in aggregate).
53. For the standard observation that many institutional investors hold too large a
portfolio to have much interest in firm-specific corporate governance, see, e.g., Robert
Cyran, Beware: Activists Are on the Hunt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2010, at B2.
54. For example, CalPERS began investing in hedge funds in 2002 and has "moved
the majority of its portfolio into direct investments in single and multistrategy hedge
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these hedge funds pursue proactive strategies, and one of their favorite
55
targets is the underleveraged firm.
The shareholders' preference for leverage is complemented (and to
a degree made possible) by the creditors' continuing expectation that
they will be protected in a federally assisted rescue of a failing financial
institution. When faced with a failing bank, the federal government has
traditionally arranged shotgun marriages through mergers (with federal
assumption of at least some of the failing firm's liabilities). 5 6 This was the
strategy followed in the cases of Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and
Wachovia during the 2008 crisis. Under this standard pattern, even if the
shareholders of the failed bank were not protected, its creditors were.
Thus, the implicit subsidy in interest rates remains and should logically
continue to motivate shareholders to seek to exploit "cheap" financing at
the cost of excessive leverage.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act purports to preclude any public
bailout of a failing financial institution, the shotgun marriage alternative
remains alive under the FDIC's resolution authority. Hence, creditors
(although not shareholders) may still expect to be saved; if so, the implicit subsidy survives. The bottom line then is that so long as some major
banks are perceived to be "too big to fail," their shareholders (or at least
the most proactive among them) will have rational incentives to exploit
the implicit subsidy in interest rates by taking on what is undue risk from
the perspective of social optimality. One can ascribe this relative indifference of shareholders to the risk of failure by their financial institution to
a variety of possible causes: (1) a belief that the government will not
allow major banks to fail, (2) a lesser level of risk aversion because shareholders are diversified, or (3) the possibility that proactive equity shareholders see short-term gains from increasing leverage and believe they
can exit the firm before it encounters financial distress. For this Article's
purposes, it is not necessary to choose a preferred theory, as all lead to
the same bottom line: Public policy must seek to counteract the excessive
shareholder tolerance for risk in the case of major financial institutions.
A focus that is limited to regulating managerial compensation is myopic
funds." Christine Williamson, Big Public Funds Outperform Their Hedge Fund Yardsticks:
Plans Studied by P&I Post Average Gain of 11% in the Portfolios, Pensions & Investments,
Sept. 20, 2010, at 1, 42. A number of other state pension funds have followed CalPERS in
this shift. Id.
55. Typically, the target of such an activist shareholder is an underperforming firm
"with a pristine balance sheet." Cyran, supra note 53. Often, the activist shareholder
proposes the sale of assets and a special dividend of the proceeds, which also raises
leverage.
56. Confronted with an approaching bank failure, the FDIC's preferred strategy has
long been to arrange a "purchase and assumption" transaction with another bank-in
effect, a shotgun marriage aided by the FDIC assuming some of the failed bank's liabilities.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market
for Bank Control, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1153, 1182 (1988). In the standard "purchase and
assumption" transaction, "the deposits of the failed bank are assumed by another bank,
which also purchases some of the failed bank's assets." Id.
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because even if compensation had been strictly regulated by the DoddFrank Act (and it was not), shareholders of financial institutions could
find other means by which to pressure and incentivize their
managements.
Ironically, the Dodd-Frank Act has actually increased the ability of
shareholders to pressure managers to increase leverage and accept
greater risk. The Act expressly authorized the SEC to adopt rules giving
shareholders "access to the proxy statement, '5 7 enabling dissidents to
mount campaigns for minority seats on the board without having to undertake costly proxy fights. The SEC responded to this invitation by
quickly adopting new Rule 14a-11, which authorizes dissident shareholders to place their nominees on the corporate board at low cost. 58 Rule
14a-11 may be a desirable counterweight to entrenched managerial
power in much of Corporate America, but again, financial institutions are
a special case. Given the natural tension between the social interest in
prudent bank regulation and the shareholder interest in profit maximization through higher leverage, corporate governance reforms that enhance shareholder power may at the same time weaken regulatory control over financial institutions. Specifically, the specter of hedge funds
and other proactive investors using their new proxy access powers to
place their candidates on the boards of major banks should give one
pause, because it will be a likely prelude to those same activists pressuring
management for increased leverage.

57. Section 971 ("Proxy Access") of the Dodd-Frank Act added a new § 14(a) (2) to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that authorizes the SEC to adopt rules under which
dissident shareholders may nominate candidates for the board of directors of a public
company and include their nominees in the issuer's own proxy statement (thereby
permitting these insurgents to economize on the costs of conducting a proxy fight). DoddFrank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78n).
58. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136,
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed.
Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010). Specifically, if certain conditions are satisfied, the new rule
will permit shareholders holding 3% or more of the corporation's voting power for a three
year holding period to nominate candidates to fill up to the greater of (1) 25% of the
director positions to be elected, or (2) one director. Id. at 56,674-75. These alternative
candidates would run against those nominated by the Board's nominating committee.
Effectively, this procedure spares the insurgents much of the costs of a proxy contest.
The business community continues to resist this SEC initiative and has sued to
invalidate the rule. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Business Trade Groups Fight New Proxy Rule,
Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2010, at A18; Jessica Holzer, Lawsuit Aims to Overturn Proxy Rule in
Overhaul, Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 2010, at C3.
Rule 14a-11 has been temporarily suspended by the SEC pending legal challenges to
its adoption. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release
No. 9151, Exchange Act Release No. 63,109, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,462,
75 Fed. Reg. 64,641, 64,641 (Oct. 20, 2010) (noting effective and compliance dates of Rule
14a-1 were stayed pending resolution of Business Roundtable's suit against the SEC).
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II.

THE PREDIcrABILITY OF SYSTEMIC FAILURES

Even if implemented decisively and administered prudently (neither
of which can be safely assumed), the Dodd-Frank Act will still not prevent
the failure of another systematically significant financial institution. Why
not? The answer stems from three interrelated factors: (1) inherent
bank fragility; (2) a recurring cyclical pattern (which this Article will call
the "regulatory sine curve") under which, after a market crash, a period
of rigorous regulatory scrutiny is followed by gradual relaxation of the
rules and possibly partial capture of the regulator by the industry; and (3)
cognitive limitations on the ability of both private gatekeepers and public
regulators to perceive new risks accurately (before it is demonstrably too
late). This claim that systemic failures will periodically recur may sound
overly provocative, but it is simply a distillation of what financial histori59
ans have long reported. From the classic work of Charles Kindleberger
60
to more recent work by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, economic historians have agreed that human beings have bounded rationality and will predictably be blindsided by a new crisis. Accordingly, this
section will attempt only a brief overview of ground that other scholars
have recently ploughed at greater depth.
A. Bank Fragility
Banks (and similar financial institutions) are subject to a fundamental mismatch between the short-term character of their liabilities and the
longer-term character of their assets. 6 1 Depositors expect and receive
high liquidity, while borrowers expect to repay their loans over a multiyear period. In good times, banks profit from this "maturity transformation," realizing the spread between the lower rate paid depositors and the
higher rate charged to borrowers. But, in bad times, banks have been
62
classically subject to "runs" when depositor confidence is shaken.
This mismatch is compounded by the necessity for a financial institution of using leverage. Only banks that employ high leverage can realize
the full economies of scale that are inherent to the banking business.
The more that a bank borrows and lends, the more it can profit on its
fixed costs. Given these natural tendencies, depositors and investors have
historically had reasons to lack confidence in banks. Thus, to maintain
investor confidence and avert runs, financial regulators have long en59. Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes (1975).
60. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight
Centuries of Financial Folly (2009).
61. For an overview, see Richard A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of '08
and the Descent into Depression 128-30 (2009).
62. For standard accounts of this tendency, see generally Charles W. Calomiris &
Joseph R. Mason, Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression, 93 Am.
Econ. Rev. 1615 (2003); Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401 (1983). For a concise summary of this
literature, see Gordon & Muller, supra note 14, at 7-13.
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gaged in "safety and soundness" regulation that is designed (at least in
part) to convince creditors that their institution can handle sudden increases in either the rate of depositor withdrawal (in the case of banks) or
in the unwillingness of short-term creditors to roll over their debt obligations (in the case of "shadow" banks, such as Bear Stearns, Lehman, or
AG).
To be sure, a traditional bank run did not cause the 2008 financial
crisis, but panic does appear to have played a role. The rise of derivatives
and asset-backed securitizations were the two most distinctive new elements that explain the 2008 crisis, and derivative trading, particularly in
the case of credit default swaps, tied together major financial institutions
as counterparties, so that the failure of one could cause the failure of
others.
Financial institutions also became more subject to systemic risk because the risks they faced became increasingly correlated. Over the decade prior to 2008, major commercial and investment banks had invested
heavily in asset-backed securitizations and profited handsomely by underwriting these new classes of securities. Either because they also invested
in these securities or just had numerous deals in the pipeline, their balance sheets were heavily laden with such securities. To hedge this risk,
they relied on credit default swaps, which largely depended on the solvency of AIG, the underlying counterparty for much of the market. Thus,
when Bear Steams effectively failed in early 2008, it was obvious that the
other major investment banks-in particular, Lehman, Merrill Lynch,
and Citigroup, which had all aggressively pursued the same business strategy-were vulnerable as well. 63 To sum up, it oversimplifies to say that
Bear Stearns or Lehman was "too big to fail," but they were both "too
interconnected to fail" and "too correlated to fail."
Although investment banks are different from commercial banks in
that they do not have depositors, they are equally subject to the same
mismatch of short-term liabilities and long-term assets, because typically
they finance their operations with short-term, often overnight borrowings
in the "repo" market. 64 Thus, when the market suspects that a financial
63. A core aspect of systemic risk is that risks are correlated. See supra note 1. If
banks are known to be following similar policies or have made similar investments, then
financial distress at one implies likely financial distress at others. Particularly when
transparency is lacking, market participants may be unwilling to advance funds or extend
credit to other financial institutions based on these "similarity" concerns. See Anabtawi &
Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 26 (discussing implications of "interconnectivity among
financial institutions" for systemic stability); Gordon & Muller, supra note 14, at 9-10
(noting depositors may "learn from the failure of one bank with a particular... strategy
that similarly situated banks-banks following a common strategy-are also at risk").
64. The term "repo" refers to "security repurchase agreements," which usually involve
highly liquid, investment grade securities that the borrower sells to the creditor at a slight
discount but agrees to repurchase at the higher market price on a very short-term basis. If
the borrower fails to repurchase, it suffers the loss of this discount. For discussion of the
repo market and its destabilizing impact on the contemporary banking system, see Gary
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institution is subject to a risk of insolvency, short-term creditors may stage
their own bank "run" by refusing to renew short-term credit lines or vastly
increasing the interest rate. This functional equivalent to a "run" by depositors appears to have happened not only at Bear Steams and Lehman,
but across the banking system in 2008.65 Gary Gorton has argued that
the 2008 panic was different from most panics in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in that it was a "wholesale" panic, not a "retail"
panic, because the market suddenly learned that the banking system as a
66
whole had become insolvent.
This point about the "wholesale" character of the crisis explains why
reforms such as private, industry-funded bailout funds are likely to prove
inadequate. Insurance can work to avert a crisis when a small percentage
of the industry may fail, but not when a plurality may all fail contemporaindusneously because of risk correlation. In 2009, much of the financial
67
try was threatened, and the banking system effectively froze.
Another dimension of the systemic risk problem involves the speed
with which regulatory interventions must be effected to work. Because of
the dependence of banks on short-term financing, the end comes quickly
for a financial institution that loses credibility with the market. Time is
therefore of the essence in any effort to structure either a bailout or a
merger to prevent a panic-inducing insolvency. When Bear Steams began to collapse on Friday, March 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve had only a
weekend to negotiate a merger between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan
Chase. No willing merger partner could be found for Lehman within
similar time constraints. 68 Resolution authority may give regulators more
time, but how much time depends on how early they recognize the crisis.
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System 15 (Oct. 18, 2010)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1676947 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
65. Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic
of 2007, at 4-5 (May 9, 2009) [hereinafter Gorton, Invisible Hand] (unpublished working
paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1401882 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
66. Id. at 37-38.
67. See Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial
Crisis of 2008, at 2-3 (July 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1297337 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding new loans to
large borrowers fell by 47% in the fourth quarter of 2008 in comparison to prior quarter,
as banks cut back lending).
68. Efforts were made to attract Barclays PLC, but Lehman's liabilities were uncertain,
and no one, including the federal government, was willing to fully assume them. After
Lehman failed, Barclays did acquire Lehman's brokerage division. To encourage it to do
so, Barclays received Federal Reserve loans under the Federal Reserve's Term Auction
Facility that eventually totaled $232 billion to "fund the liabilities it took on with the
acquisition of collapsed investment bank Lehman Brothers." See Richard Blackden,
Barclays Took Biggest U.S. Loan During Crisis, Daily Telegraph (London), Dec. 2, 2010, at
5. Even these loans were simply to finance the acquisition of Lehman's brokerage division,
and far greater liabilities would have had to be assumed to make it possible for any firm to
have acquired its parent.
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Both in the case of Bear Steams and Lehman, regulators appear to have
been unaware of the depth of the problems at both firms until relatively
near the end. In light of this tendency for regulators to recognize and
react to an approaching crisis only belatedly, public policy needs measures that respond earlier based on objective criteria and that do not depend on the subjective judgments of regulators as to when a crisis requires governmental intervention. Finally, if the goal is to reassure the
market, it may be self-defeating to force a very troubled firm into receivership in order to aid it; the market reaction may be far more dramatic to
such a step than simply to the conversion of some of the firm's debt to
equity.
B. The Political Economy of FinancialRegulation
Most agree that lax regulation on the part of all financial regulators
played a significant role in the 2008 financial crisis. But why did this happen? The answer is not that federal financial regulators were incompetent or foolish. Rather, the answer begins with the fact that they were
continually on the defensive during the "boom" years after 2000. The
period from 2000 on was an era of aggressive deregulation. In 2000,
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which deregulated over-the-counter (OTC) swaps, including, of course, credit default swaps, withdrawing them from the supervision of both the SEC and
the CFTC. 69 In 2004, the SEC adopted its Consolidated Supervised Entity
Program, which freed the five largest U.S. investment banks that were not
part of a bank holding company (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan
Stanley, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns) from the SEC's net capital
rule. 70 The result was a sharp increase in leverage at all five firms-at
exactly the wrong time from a regulatory standpoint.
Even as of 2008, the industry was pressing for still more deregulation.
The message it constantly stressed was that the United States was losing its
international competitiveness to other less regulated capital markets
(which in blunter terms meant that New York was losing its edge to
London, where "light touch" regulation reigned and litigation was disfavored). In 2006, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation released
its influential "Interim Report," which called for significant dismantling
of the existing regulatory structure in order to restore the United States'
capital market competitiveness. 71 In 2007, Mayor Bloomberg and
69. Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365. For the representative
view (shared by many) that this Act was "ill-advised" and laid the foundation for the 2008
crisis, see Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-theCounter Derivatives, 13 N.C. Banking Inst. 123, 128 (2009).
70. For a concise discussion of the Consolidated Supervised Entity Program and its
consequences, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 707, 735-40 (2009).
71. See generally Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Interim Report 80-91 (2006),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/l1.30CommitteeInterim-ReportREV2.pdf
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Senator Charles Schumer of New York issued a similar report (albeit
more moderate in tone), which also called for deregulation to protect
New York City's role as the world's leading financial center. 72 In 2008,
the Treasury Department issued a provocative study that recommended
the consolidation of financial regulators, greater reliance on self-regulation, and reduced enforcement. 73 Yet, at the same time as these reports
were calling for looser, more "principles-based" regulation, the first signs
of collapse in the subprime mortgage market were already becoming
apparent.
None of this should surprise us. The collective interest of the financial community at the end of a boom is to keep the boom going. Contrary indicators may be collectively repressed. Within the major financial
institutions, those who had been the architects of new financial technologies (for example, asset-backed securitizations and credit default swaps)
had risen in power and prestige. Any call for increased regulation was an
implied criticism of them and was met with stubborn hostility. Internal
self-criticism within financial institutions only came later, after the crash,
when the once proud leaders of these firms had departed in relative disgrace. More generally, a boom increases the power of the industry vis-Avis regulators. The longer it continues, the more their business acumen
seems confirmed, and the more tentative and equivocal regulators become in urging caution and prudence.
Regulatory arbitrage, in the sense of one nation actively seeking to
lure firms from other more regulated countries, did not drive this process
of deregulation. But regulatory disparities did enable the U.S. financial
industry to insist on maintaining the deregulation of OTC derivatives and
the limited oversight of investment bank leverage by giving them a powerful argument: Increase regulation, they claimed, and our bank will be
forced to shift its operations abroad. Prosperity, it was argued, depended
on leaving the financial industry alone and trusting in its enlightened
self-regulation.
After the crash, deregulation and self-regulation are no longer in
vogue. Still, the past is prologue. How long will it take for these same
attitudes to reappear? The answer probably depends on how far off the
next economic boom is. Only in a boom period are financial executives
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). Full disclosure requires the acknowledgement that
this author contributed to this report (although he was critical of some of its deregulatory
proposals).
72. See Jenny Anderson, U.S. Financial Sector Is Losing Its Edge, Report Says, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 22, 2007, at C3 (describing Bloomberg/Schumer Report). Full disclosure
again requires the admission that this author was consulted in the preparation of this
report. Many of the criticisms in these two reports were probably well justified, but neither
report fully recognized that deregulation carried risks and could produce catastrophe.
73. Dep't of Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure
(2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
Blueprint.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Professor Sale and I have criticized
aspects of this proposal at length elsewhere. Coffee & Sale, supra note 70, at 749-73.
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treated as omniscient and farsighted. Recent history shows, however, the
swiftness with which attitudes can change. In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley sailed
through both Houses of Congress, receiving a unanimous vote in the
Senate. A few years later, it was being blamed by politicians and conservative academics as a leading cause of the United States's reduced international competitiveness. The Dodd-Frank Act will likely encounter a similar experience. 7 4 Moreover, far more than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
Dodd-Frank Act delegates power to administrative agencies, who must,
over the next two years, adopt detailed regulations on a variety of lowvisibility topics, all of which threaten to reduce the profitability of the
financial industry.
Although new restrictions on leverage at financial institutions are
certain, the financial industry has shown extraordinary creativity in finding new ways to hide liabilities off their balance sheets. That the major
banks were able to conceal billions in liabilities off their balance sheets in
SIVs and similar conduits in the period preceding 2008, and that they did
so only a few years after Enron collapsed in disgrace in 2001 as a result of
similar accounting manipulation, does not inspire confidence in regulatory capacity or vigilance. 75 What was essentially the same accounting
subterfuge worked twice, only a few years apart. Moreover, "window
dressing" that improves financial ratios and masks high leverage appears
to be a relatively common practice at financial institutions. 76 Thus, even
74. This second cycle, paralleling the earlier response of "free market" academics to
Sarbanes-Oxley, has already begun. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack
Corporate Governance Round II, at 5 (U.C.L.A. Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper
No. 10-12, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673575 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) ("Dodd-Frank is to corporate governance as quackery is to medical practice.").
This paper self-consciously follows Professor Roberta Romano's earlier attack on the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521 (2005). Similar efforts will predictably follow.
75. In the period leading up to the 2008 crash, banks evaded capital adequacy and
leverage requirements by creating off-balance-sheet special investment vehicles (S1Vs) to
hold large volumes of "super senior" tranches of mortgage-backed CDOs. To purchase
and hold these CDOs, the banks relied on short-term debt, thereby exposing themselves to
the danger of a panic and a bank run. Daniel Covitz et al., The Evolution of a Financial
Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market 10, 30 (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Working Paper No. 2009-36, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/
2009/200936/200936pap.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
76. A recent examination of the financial statements of the more than 300 U.S. banks
and savings institutions that failed over the last four years reveals significant disparities in
how they reported their financial condition. According to an analysis by Keefe, Bruyette &
Woods, Inc., a specialist in the banking industry, a number of these firms had seemingly
strong financial statements with roughly average tangible common equity ratios. Jean
Eaglesham, Hard Call for FDIC: When to Shut Bank, Wall St.J., Dec. 29, 2010, at Cl. This
evidence does not imply that "strong banks" were placed into receivership, but rather that
failing banks often found ways to dress up their financial statements.
In the wake of Lehman's aggressive use of "window dressing" (including its "Repo
105" transactions, which involved entering into repo transactions on the last day of each
quarter to reduce its reported liabilities and financial ratios), the SEC has adopted a new
policy to restrict such end-of-the-quarter manipulation of short-term borrowings. Short-
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if elaborate new rules are adopted, requiring greater capital adequacy,
the industry will both lobby for loopholes and exemptions in these arcane
regulations or employ "window dressing" to camouflage problems.
Enforcement will thus likely be ad hoc and discretionary, depending
in part on the financial institution's political clout. Moreover, as the crisis fades in the public's memory, the same claims that the U.S. is losing its
international competitiveness will be raised again as a justification for relaxing regulation. To be sure, the model for enlightened "light touch"
regulation may no longer be London. Instead, the proposed paragon of
enlightened minimalist regulation could be Singapore, Hong Kong, or
new financial centers elsewhere. But the dynamic will be the same.
As a result, the intensity of regulatory supervision is likely to follow a
sine curve: stricter regulation after a crash, followed by gradual relaxation thereafter. As the recent work of financial historians Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff suggests, this cycle has recurred many
times, with its duration depending on the severity of each crash and the
intensity of each boom. 77 The point here is not that regulation is futile,
but that it is insufficient for policymakers to rely on preventive, "safety
and soundness" regulation alone. However well-intended, such regulation will predictably be outflanked, relaxed, or rendered obsolete by later
78
developments.
Moreover, some regulatory interventions are likely to be intensely
fought by powerful firms able to retain an army of lobbyists. Imagine that
financial regulators in the future do detect a Lehman or AIG in the making a year or more before its likely failure. Not only can regulators expect
an intense and well-financed political pushback from the threatened
Term Borrowings Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9143, Exchange Act Release No.
62,932, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,866 (proposed Sept. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229,
249). But the SEC is pursuing a "catch up" strategy here, and new techniques for hiding
liabilities, which work for a time until the SEC catches up, will predictably be found.
77. See Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 60, at 223-39 (noting "broadly similar patterns
in housing and equity prices, unemployment, government revenues, and debt" in past
financial crises in an array of countries).
78. These skeptical comments apply not only to how federal regulators will use their
new resolution authority, but also to how comprehensively they will extend the new
supervisory powers that the Dodd-Frank Act gave them. That Act requires extensive
implementation. For example, to reduce systemic risk, Congress legislated that over-thecounter derivatives would become exchange traded and would settle though centralized
clearinghouses, but left in loopholes. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. 7, pt. 2, 124
Stat. 1376, 1658-1754 (2010) ("Regulation of Swap Markets"). One such loophole is that
some over-the-counter derivatives might be too specialized to trade over exchanges or
through clearinghouses. As the Dodd-Frank Act is implemented, the process will involve
the issuance of highly technical regulations in a low transparency environment. One need
not be a cynic to expect that the industry will dominate this rule-drafting process and will
resist exchange trading and the use of clearinghouses. This resistance is already evident.
See Victoria McGrane & Deborah Solomon, CFTC Need for Speed Causes Strains, Wall St.
J., Dec. 14, 2010, at C1 (reporting financial industry is seeking to slow down and resist
CFTC's efforts to require use of exchanges and clearinghouses for trading of over-thecounter derivatives).
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firm, but the attempt to shut down such a doomed entity may itself produce market disruption (and possible panic) for which the regulators and
the incumbent administration will be blamed. Politically, the liquidation
of a significant financial institution may be interpreted as an admission of
regulatory failure; accordingly, the incumbent administration may seek to
avoid the adverse political fallout by seeking to dissuade regulators from
taking decisive action (at least until after the next election). Hence, the

regulatory appetite to intervene may be limited, even if the problems are
recognized in advance.
In short, because dramatic regulatory interventions are likely to be
politically costly and because the implementation process will tend to
favor the industry, other techniques must be used in combination with
preventive regulation to reduce the risk of financial contagion. The earlier, more expected, and less intrusive such interventions are, the less

they are likely to be resisted or stalemated by legal or political challenges.
Contingent capital can and should be designed to fit within these
parameters.
C. Bounded Rationality: Psychological Limits on Risk Perception
To this point, this Article has implicitly assumed that the financial
industry overreached investors and that its recklessness largely explains
the 2008 crisis. But both sides may have shared responsibility. Moral hazard and agency cost problems may have caused financial institutions, as
well as investors, to overlook or repress evidence of the toxic quality of
the new financial products entering the market.
The fact that the major banks themselves retained significant positions in the products they were marketing, either by holding collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) in their own portfolios or by guaranteeing
the obligations of the SIVs that they created, is evidence of this mutual
failure. This suggests that few adequately understood the level of risk that
all were assuming. The failure of AIG fits within this category especially
well: The management of AIG allowed the firm to insure most of the
subprime market through credit default swaps, without adequately understanding the sudden liquidity risks that could befall it on a ratings
downgrade.
In short, it is conceivable that no one knew what they were doing and
all underperceived the risks. A number of recent commentators have advanced this perspective, arguing that risk was systematically underestimated. 79 These commentators advance wide-ranging analyses of the indi79. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A
Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial Risk-Taking, 96
Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 12-13), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1639138 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Gary Gorton, The
Subprime Panic, 15 Eur. Fin. Mgrnt. 10, 37 (2009) (noting "asymmetric information"
meant investors lacked understanding about financial instruments' structures and levels of
risk (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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vidual heuristics and biases that cause individuals and organizations to
underperceive risk. 80 Without entering this debate, this Article simply
notes that behavioral economics suggests that cognitive limitations may
blind both market participants and regulators to approaching danger.
But what is the implication of this research for public policy? The
short answer advanced here is that everyone-the financial industry, regulators, and investors-can underestimate risk and respond slowly to
mounting evidence of an approaching crisis. All can repress adverse information because its recognition may force them to concede earlier mistakes. If so, one cannot depend exclusively on preventive "safety and
soundness" regulation. Rather, one needs failsafe remedies, such as industry insurance funds or contingent capital, that are triggered automatically to mitigate the financial crisis when the bubble eventually bursts.
Put simply, if bubbles will recur, one needs to build into the system lossabsorbing mechanisms that work off of objective market signals and not
the subjective discretion of regulators.
D. TraditionalCrisis Regulation Versus Dodd-Frank'sApproach
In the late nineteenth century, Walter Bagehot succinctly defined
the role of the central banker: to serve as the lender of last resort, and
thereby to prevent a liquidity crisis from creating a financial panic that
froze the markets and depressed the economy.8 1 The central banker, he
advised, had to quickly distinguish between banks facing a liquidity crisis
and those that were truly insolvent. The latter should be shut down
quickly, but the former should have funds made easily available to them
(but at a penalty rate of interest) to avert a general panic. In practice, the
line between a liquidity crisis and true insolvency has proven difficult to
draw, but for well over a century central bankers have generally recognized the wisdom of Bagehot's advice. Because of inherent bank fragility,
quick intervention is necessary, and its goal should be to save fundamentally sound banks while winnowing out the truly insolvent.
80. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human
Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism 167 (2009)
(arguing "[t]he crisis was not foreseen" because "[c]onventional economic theories
exclude the changing thought patterns and modes of doing business that bring on a
crisis"); Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial
Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9J. Corp. L. Stud. 23, 28 (2009) (arguing "the
neglect or under-estimation of the behavioural aspects of the global financial crisis is
arguably the biggest shortcoming of ...otherwise very valuable policy reforms"); Geoffrey
P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex
Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 807, 813 (2010)
(describing various cognitive biases as "intellectual hazard" that "poses a threat to the
smooth, orderly, and efficient functioning of the world's financial markets").
81. Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 38
(Batoche Books 2001) (1873). For a discussion of the U.S. experience with bank panics
(which were recurrent prior to the FDIC's creation), see generally Gary Gorton, Banking
Panics and Business Cycles, 40 Oxford Econ. Papers 751 (1988).
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The Dodd-Frank Act appears to turn Bagehot's advice on its head.
Essentially, it denies bank regulators the ability to target funds to
threatened financial institutions, except in cases where the financial institution is to be liquidated pursuant to the FDIC's resolution authority.
Thus, the FDIC can advance funds, or guarantee debts, to those firms
under the death sentence of a liquidation, but neither it nor the Federal
Reserve can do much to help the potentially solvent firm that is teetering
on the brink. Because most financial firms are unlikely to concede that
they are insolvent (but may readily acknowledge that they need liquidity),
the central banker after Dodd-Frank is curtailed in its ability to perform
its traditional "lender of last resort" function and must act more as a financial undertaker.
To see this point, one must understand that prior to the Dodd-Frank
Act, both the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the FDIC had authority
to make emergency loans to a troubled financial institution to avert its
insolvency, and the FRB actually used this authority to bail out AIG. After
the Dodd-Frank Act, both agencies have been greatly restricted in their
ability to lend to a failing nonbank financial firm, 82 except to the extent
that such a firm is being liquidated pursuant to the special "resolution
83
authority" that the Dodd-Frank Act gives the FDIC.
82. Section 1101 (a) (6) of the Dodd-Frank Act restricts the FRB's former authority
under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to make emergency loans to a failing
institution. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1101 (a) (6), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113-15
(2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343). Under section 1101 (a) (6), the FRB can no
longer lend to a single firm, but it can make emergency loans "for the purpose of
providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a failing financial company." Id.
Such lending must be incident to a "program or facility with broad-based eligibility." Id.
Further, section 1101(a)(6) provides that such loans must be fully and adequately
collateralized in a manner that "is sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses." Id. Neither
Lehman nor AIG could have satisfied this standard. Finally, section 1101 (a) (6) specifically
denies the FRB the power to make loans to a "single and specific company" under its
emergency lending authority or to make loans "for the purpose of assisting a single and
specific company to avoid bankruptcy, resolution under tide II of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, or any other Federal or State insolvency
proceeding." Id. In substance, this language makes explicit that the FRB's emergency
lending authority cannot encompass targeted bailout loans to a future AIG or Lehman.
In the case of the FDIC, which is permitted to lend to a "covered financial company"
in receivership under section 204(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, section 212(a) ("No Other
Funding") bars the provision of funds by the FDIC to such companies outside of a Tide II
receivership. Id. §§ 204(d), 212(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384, 5392). Although
the FDIC can guarantee the obligations of a firm that is being liquidated (and there is no
ceiling on its authority in this regard), it can do nothing for an individual firm that
remains solvent. Possibly, the FDIC will continue to arrange mergers or "purchases and
assumptions." See supra note 56 and accompanying text. But, as Lehman showed, there is
not always an available buyer.
83. Section 204(d) ("Funding for Orderly Liquidation") of the Dodd-Frank Act
authorizes the FDIC to make loans to, or to guarantee the obligations of, a "covered
financial company" (i.e., a company in receivership under Tide II), but, as just noted,
section 212(a) precludes lending to such firms outside this receivership context. DoddFrank Act §§ 204(d), 212(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5384, 5392).
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In place of this former "bailout" authority, Title II of the Act
("Orderly Liquidation Authority") attempts to craft an intermediate option between a bankruptcy and a bailout. Title 1I's compromise, which
will apply in the future to nonbank financial firms (such as a Lehman,
Bear Steams, or AIG), intends a controlled winding up of the failing nonbank, rather than a reorganization in bankruptcy. Although the FDIC
can advance funds to keep such a firm afloat until the liquidation is completed, neither the FDIC nor the FRB can advance funds to a specific
company to enable it to avoid insolvency. 84 Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act
makes FDIC receivership the exclusive route by which such a firm can
receive funds from these agencies. This presents a major problem for the
firm that is not yet insolvent (and whose shareholders would be wiped out
in a liquidation), but that faces a serious liquidity crisis. As just noted,
these were the firms that bank regulation classically sought to save. Just
as in Vietnam, where it was allegedly necessary to "destroy the village to
save it," the Dodd-Frank Act may actually force some firms into an arguably unnecessary liquidation in order to qualify them for loans. Finally, an
overarching question is whether the FRB or the FDIC will have the political courage to place a significant financial institution into receivership
before it has clearly failed. Politically, it may be safer and easier to delay
and hope for the best.
At this juncture, the utility of contingent capital comes into clearer
focus as an alternative means by which to avert unnecessary liquidations.
An unjustifiable gap exists between the reach of "safety and soundness"
regulation and that of resolution authority. In this zone, financial regulators can do little to help the firm that is not insolvent but that faces a
liquidity crisis and may fail because, absent some intervention, short-term
creditors are likely to rationally race for exit and refuse to roll over their
loans. Recent major financial failures have recurrently involved firms
that experienced such a fate.8 5 For the future, it is a lamentably safe prediction that the same overworked, underfunded, and politically pressured
financial regulators that missed Long-Term Capital Management, the
2000 IPO stock bubble, Enron, WorldCom, the subprime mortgage crisis,
and Bernie Madoff will again miss or fail to call attention to a developing
crisis, until it is too late.
III.

THE FAILSAFE OPTION:

CONTINGENT CAPITAL AS A COMPLEMENT TO

REGULATORY OVERSIGHT

Nothing in what has been said so far challenges the need for "safety
and soundness" regulation of financial institutions or the wisdom of a
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
85. For a recent history of such failures in addition to Lehman and AIG,see Anabtawi
& Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 8-12 (discussing systemic failures since the Great Depression,
including Enron and Long-Term Capital Management); see also Covitz et al., supra note
75, at 2-6 (discussing "panic" in short-term commercial paper market); Gorton, Invisible
Hand, supra note 65, at 33-34 (discussing similar problem in "repo" market).
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private, industry-funded bailout fund. 86 The more modest claim has instead been that such preventive safeguards must be supplemented by additional measures. Precisely because the regulator is neither omniscient
nor always politically free to act in the manner that it wants, other checks
need to be built into the system. But, as just seen, the Dodd-Frank Act
actually reduces the options available to regulators for dealing with a
troubled financial institution in order to prevent public bailouts. Properly designed, contingent capital can fill much of this void.
A. The Contingent CapitalAlternative: Some Background

The idea of contingent capital as a means of stabilizing large financial firms is relatively new, and its discussion has been largely confined to
financial economists. 8 7 Generally, it has been agreed that contingent
capital should reduce effective leverage, the risk of a bankruptcy, and the
justifications for a bailout. 88 For these reasons, the Basel Committee on

Banking Supervision, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe
(AFME), and the Squam Lake Working Group have endorsed the concept, and the Financial Stability Board seems to be leaning in its favor.8 9
Lloyd's Banking Group actually issued such a security in 2009, and
Rabobank followed with a larger offering in 2010.90 Most recently, in late
86. The House version of the Dodd-Frank Act, which passed the House in December
2009, did contain a significant private insurance fund, but it was dropped at the
Conference Committee stage. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1609(n) (as passed by House,
Dec. 11, 2009); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery, No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline via
"Reverse Convertible Debentures", in Capital Adequacy Beyond Basel: Banking, Securities
and Insurance 171, 171-72 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) [hereinafter Flannery, No Pain]; Mark
J. Flannery, Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates 3
(Oct. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1485689
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Flannery, Stabilizing]; Robert L.
McDonald, Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger 1 (Feb. 15, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553430 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw
Review).
88. See, e.g., George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital 28
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-04, 2010), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=1595080 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Flannery, Stabilizing,
supra note 87, at 3; McDonald, supra note 87, at 1.
89. See supra note 27 (noting support of FSB, Basel Committee, Goldman Sachs CEO
Lloyd Blankfein, and others); see also Harry Wilson, Bonds Must Take Place of Bail Outs in
Future, Daily Telegraph
(London), Aug. 13, 2010, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/7941485/Bonds-must-take-place-of-bank-bailouts-in-future.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining AFME's support for
contingent capital as most practical alternative); Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin.
Regulation, An Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms:
Regulatory Hybrid Securities 3 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://www.cfr. org/economics/expedited-resolution-mechanism-distressed-financialfirms-regulatory-hybrid-securities/pl9002
(on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(expressing support for such a security).
90. See Wilson, supra note 89 (noting Lloyds Banking Group issued such a security in
2009 and that market already refers to this new type of security as "cocos" for "contingent
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2010, Credit Suisse announced plans to issue as much as $30 billion in
contingent capital bonds, beginning in 2011, in order to comply with the
stricter Swiss capital adequacy requirements for banks, 9 1 and Barclays
Capital has indicated an intent to issue contingent capital securities to its
92
employees as a form of executive compensation.
Much of the academic discussion has assumed that mandatory conversion was a means of scaling back the issuer's debt, and has therefore
focused on the incentives of the issuer to either manipulate the market or
increase the firm's level of risk following the issuance of such a security. 93
Several papers have focused on the mechanics for specifying the conver94
sion ratio and whether a single or a dual price trigger should be used,
while other commentators have worried about the absence of any clear
equilibrium associated with the use of contingent capital. 9 5 These concerns are relevant to this Article only to the extent that contingent capital
96
might invite market manipulation.
convertibles"). In 2010, Rabobank sold a 1.25 billion euro unsecured ten-year bond that
would convert into equity if the bank lost $15 billion of its roughly $35 billion in equity.
Peter Lee, Rabobank Brings Contingent to New-Issue Market, Euromoney, Apr. 2010, at
29. The interest rate on the bonds was 6.875% or 351 basis points above the yield on
equivalent swaps. On this basis, the offering was easily oversubscribed. Id. For a further
description of these offerings, see infra notes 99, 117, 119 and accompanying text.
91. See Baer & Guerrera, supra note 29 (noting Credit Suisse might issue as much as
$30 billion in such bonds over the next several years). For a description of the stricter
Swiss rules on capital adequacy, see supra note 23.
92. Rob Cox, A Pay System That May Please, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2010, at B2; see also
Guerrera et al., supra note 29. The idea is intended to align managerial interests with
those of creditors and regulators.
93. Pennacchi concludes that a moral hazard incentive does arise following the
issuance of contingent capital to increase the firm's level of risk, but that it is less than that
which arises on the issuance of subordinated debt. Pennacchi, supra note 88, at 28. To
reduce the incentive to manipulate (by persons who might buy the contingent security and
short the common stock), some have proposed more complicated designs under which the
newly issued security can be repurchased. E.g., George Pennacchi et al., Contingent
Capital: The Case for COERCs 9 (INSEAD Faculty & Research, Working Paper No. 2010/
89/FIN, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656994 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing features of proposed "call option enhanced reverse convertible"
bond). But see infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text (concluding contingent
capital security, as proposed in this Article, would be less vulnerable to manipulation).
94. E.g., McDonald, supra note 87, at 2. McDonald favors a dual trigger which would
convert the debt only when the firm's own stock price and a stock index price for similar
financial institutions both declined to defined levels. He argues that if banks generally are
not in distress, there is less reason to spare the individual bank from bankruptcy and that a
dual trigger reduces the prospect of price manipulation. Id. at 4, 20. The dual trigger may
indeed reduce the prospect of manipulation, but if we are focused on systematically
significant financial institutions, the bankruptcy of even one could be catastrophic.
95. See Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang, Design of Contingent Capital with a
Stock Price Trigger for Mandatory Conversion 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report
No. 448, 2010) (arguing contingent capital proposals do not usually lead to a "unique
equilibrium" in equity or contingent capital prices).
96. Because, as proposed here, the debt security would convert into a preferred stock
and not a common stock, its volatility would be far lower and thus the incentive to
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Instead, the design advocated here seeks to protect the debt holder
from loss on conversion and deliberately imposes the burden instead on
the common shareholders. This potential wealth transfer is intended to
deter the equity from approaching the trigger points at which conversion
would occur-and thus to disincentivize shareholders at systemically significant financial institutions from tolerating excessive leverage.
To date, commentators have not focused at all on voting rights. This
is understandable because if the debt security converts into common
stock, the newly issued shares would predictably come to be owned by the
same categories of institutional investors as already held that common
stock. 97 Little would change. Voting rights are, however, a special attraction of using a nonconvertible preferred stock with a fixed return. The
holders of such a fixed return security have interests naturally aligned
with the debt holders and should vote in a manner consistent with the
debt's interests to resist increases in risk. From this starting point, issues
about conversion ratios, procedures, and pricing come into a sharper focus, and concerns about wealth transfers between bondholders and common shareholders can be more coherently addressed.
B. Designing Contingent Capital
In designing an equity security to underlie the issuer's bonds, both
firms and regulators must recognize that they are offering a novel security
to basically risk-averse debt investors. These debt investors may rationally
fear that the new security locks them into a sinking ship (the banking
industry's Titanic) or asks them to bear a loss to support the common
stockholders. The more debt investors suspect such a purpose, the more
they will resist contingent capital. Precisely to counter those fears, the
design of the convertible security must minimize the likelihood of any
wealth transfer from bondholders to common stockholders. 98 Conversely, it is both acceptable (and arguably desirable) if the reverse wealth
transfer occurs from stockholders to the former bondholders, because
this creates a disincentive for shareholders to increase the firm's risk
level. Nonetheless, the idea that creditors should be spared is far from
manipulate should be much weaker. In addition, use of a dual price trigger (as proposed
by McDonald, supra note 87) can eliminate the ability of the would-be manipulators to
force a conversion. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text. The potential for
manipulation may also be reduced if the trigger for mandatory conversion is set by the
spread on credit default swaps, rather than stock price levels.
97. This is both because some debt investors (for example, money market funds)
cannot legally hold common stock and, more generally, because the holders of debt
securities tend to be risk averse (or at least want to maintain their prior portfolio balance
and so, after conversion, will replace the former debt security that they held with a new
debt security by selling the common stock that they receive).
98. Of course, the former bondholders will experience losses if their firm continues
to decline after the time of conversion. The point here is only that they should not be
asked to subsidize or share losses with the common shareholders through a conversion
formula that writes down their claims.
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universally accepted; indeed, in the first major transaction in which a contingent capital security was offered to investors, its terms provided for a
severe writedown for the bondholders on conversion. 99
1. The Conversion Formula. - The simplest and most feasible conversion formula would be to convert the bonds into a similar principal
amount of preferred stock. Thus, $1,000,000 in principal amount of
bonds would convert into 10,000 shares of preferred stock with a $100
par value. This is an easy decision, because, in the case of preferred
stock, the critical issue is how to adjust the dividend rate on the shares to
hold the former bondholders harmless. Here, two possibilities can be
reasonably debated. First, one could provide in the bond indenture a
specific dividend rate on the preferred stock that would be sufficient to
cause the preferred stock to trade at par in the market (at least as of the
time of the bonds' original issuance). Thus, if the bonds were issued at,
say, a 9% interest rate, it might follow that the dividend rate would be,
hypothetically, 12% (or whatever rate would then permit the preferred
stock to trade at par).
Alternatively, another possible procedure would be to appoint, in
the bond indenture, an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators to specify the
dividend rate at the time of conversion. The indenture would instruct
the arbitrators to select the dividend rate that would enable a nonparticipating preferred stock issued by a company of a similar risk level to trade
at par (subject possibly to some ceiling level). This alternative could provide a windfall to the bondholders (for example, if interest rates moved
upward between the time of issuance of the bonds and their conversion),
or it could even pay them less than the first alternative (if interest rates
over the same time period fell). Still, it would assure the bondholders
that their preferred stock would actually trade closer to par than under
the first alternative, thereby reducing the prospect that the issuer could
seek to force a conversion to exploit the bondholders.
Under either formula, the likely dividend rate on the preferred stock
will be higher than the interest rate on the bonds. Thus, conversion will
increase the servicing costs to the financially strained issuer. This should
not concern us from a public policy perspective, because unpaid dividends cannot result in a default, but simply in the buildup of cumulative
arrearages. Also, because the likely servicing cost to the issuer should

99. In the Rabobank issuance in 2010, which is discussed supra at note 90 and infra at
notes 117 and 119, "investors [would] lose 75% of their money" on conversion. Louise
Bowman, Bank Capital and Regulation: Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't,
Euromoney, June 2010, at 92, 95. The terms of the offering required redemption of the
bonds at 25%. The Rabobank transaction appears to have been marketable largely
because the bank had an AAA rating, and the risk of conversion seemed remote. Id. For
more detail on the Rabobank issuance, see supra note 90 and accompanying text and infra
notes 117, 119.
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increase under either alternative, there is less reason to fear that the issuer will seek to manipulate its stock price to force a conversion. 10 0
2. The Timing of Conversion. - Possibly the most important design
issue involves the choice of the trigger point or points at which conversion becomes mandatory. Should it await the twelfth hour when the financial institution's failure has become virtually inevitable? Or should
intervention begin at an earlier point and involve a series of partial conversions of the contingent bonds (say, 25% at each of four thresholds)?
Those favoring a minimalist strategy will probably favor a delayed
conversion that waits until the twelfth hour, because this approach
reduces the prospect of any conversion occurring. Under such an approach, contingent capital is essentially substituting for a liquidation pursuant to the FDIC's resolution authority; the use of such a security would
amount to the equivalent of a prepackaged bankruptcy. Still, there are
reasons to prefer earlier and multiple conversions. First, if we wish to
deter excessive risk taking, an early partial conversion seems preferable,
precisely to create a stock market penalty that warns shareholders that
high leverage can lead to painful dilution.
Second, from a political perspective, it makes sense to prefer multiple incremental conversions to a single major conversion. To reduce
market shock, an incremental design might hypothetically convert 25%
of the bonds on a 25% stock price decline from the stock price on the
date of the bonds' issuance; another 25% might convert on a further 25%
decline; and the balance would convert if the stock price fell 75% (or
more) from the original price. 10 1 Because the market's anticipatory reaction to each incremental conversion will be less dramatic than to the approach of a single 100% conversion, the prospect of a political nullification (such as by means of a regulatory waiver, legislative relief, or even
shareholder amendment of the issuer's certificate of incorporation)
seems less likely.
100. Conceivably, an attractive premium on conversion could create a corresponding
incentive for price manipulation by bondholders. But this scenario seems less likely, and
management could resist such manipulative efforts by causing their corporation to make
stock purchases in the open market.
101. To illustrate the impact of such a conversion, assume that a financial institution
has 100 million shares of common stock outstanding, which have long been trading at
$100 per share (for a total market equity capitalization of $10 billion). It also has issued $6
billion in contingent capital debt. Under financial stress, its stock price now declines to
$75 per share (or below) for a period sufficient to trigger conversion. As a result, $2
billion of these bonds (which could be selected by lot, just as in the case of a bond sinking
fund) would convert into 20 million shares of preferred stock, $100 par value. This would
be a significant, but not yet dominant, voting block. On a further decline in the financial
institution's share price to $50 per share or below, another 20 million shares of this
preferred would be issued, with the balance of the contingent debt converting if the stock
price fell to $25 or below. Nothing would prevent the financial institution from selling
additional common stock if it wishes to change the ratio between the preferred and
common stock outstanding.
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Use of the market price as a trigger supplies an objective measure
that is less easily manipulated than accounting standards. Alternatively, a
defined widening of credit default spreads on the issuer's debt may sup10 2
ply another potential objective measure.
Other additional triggers might be used. For example, a rating
downgrade of the bonds by a major ratings agency to a level below investment grade might trigger a conversion of some percentage of the bonds
(say, 50%). This would again penalize the shareholders more than the
bondholders and disincline shareholders from pressuring their firm for
increased risk or leverage after the issuance of the bonds. The problem
with such a trigger, however, is that ratings downgrades to below invest10 3
ment grade may not occur until the very brink of bankruptcy.
Possibly the most important rationale for early and incremental conversion is to enable the new preferred shareholders to exercise influence
on the corporate board as voting shareholders. If the new preferred
shareholders are to be given voting rights in the hope that this will alter
corporate governance at the issuer and/or affect managerial preferences,
such an issuance cannot come at the twelfth hour if it is to work. Corporate governance changes take time, discussion, and negotiation. Nor is it
reasonable to trigger the complete conversion of the debt security into
preferred stock based only on a moderate stock price decline (which
might occur for extrinsic reasons and later be reversed). Hence, a series
of smaller conversions, beginning at an early point, seems preferable.
Others have suggested that conversion should be triggered by a regulator's decision that additional equity capital was needed.' 0 4 However,
this may place too much faith both in the issuer's accounting or in regulators. Market declines-in stock prices or credit default spreads-seem a
more reliable measure of stress (although prudence suggests that the
closing stock price should have to remain below the specified level for
102. There is, however, a complication with the use of credit default spreads. Because
conversion will reduce the outstanding debt, credit default spreads would be meaningless
in the case of the convertible security (as it cannot default). Moreover, the credit default
spread on senior, nonconvertible classes of debt might tighten (or at least remain stable)
as a mandatory conversion neared, because these assets are benefitted by the conversion
(even if the firm's position has deteriorated). Conceivably, a credit default swap could still
define conversion as a "credit event" that triggers a payoff to the holder of the credit
default swap, but this would represent a windfall if the senior debt holders benefitted from
the conversion. Nonetheless, in general, credit default spreads represent an alternative
trigger to stock price decline, with either causing a mandatory conversion.
103. In the well-known example of Enron, its debt continued to be rated investment
grade by the major rating agencies until just four days before its bankruptcy. John C.
Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 34 (2006); Claire
Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 43, 43 (2004).
104. E.g., Flannery, No Pain, supra note 87, at 182-87 (recommending tying
conversion of debt security to decline in bank's equity ratio). In contrast, McDonald
recommends against the use of accounting numbers in the trigger or conversion formulas
(and this Article agrees). McDonald, supra note 87, at 1.
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some brief period-say, three or more trading days-before the conversion trigger would be pulled).
3. Voting Rights. - A reasonable debate is equally possible over the
nature of the voting rights that the preferred stock should carry. Often,
preferred stock is issued on a basis under which it votes only if its dividend is missed. Yet, because the goal here is to create a voting counterweight to the risk-neutral stance of the common stockholders, voting
rights should commence immediately on conversion, without waiting for
a default on the preferred dividend as a precondition.
A related choice is how the preferred stock should vote: i.e., with the
common as a single class, or, alternatively, as a separate class that would
have the right to elect a specified number of directors (say, one quarter
of the board). This latter provision would require classification of the
board, which would usually require a charter amendment, unless the corporation had a "blank check" preferred stock provision in its certificate of
incorporation. 10 5 Allowing both the common and preferred classes to
vote as a single class has the virtue of simplicity and is less likely to produce a factionalized board of directors.
If a more potent remedy is desired, the preferred could be given
multiple votes per share. The case for such a "super-voting" provision is
strongest when the initial conversion would likely result in a class of preferred with only modest voting power (say, 10% or less). Again, such a
super-voting provision would have to be authorized by the certificate of
incorporation (or by a "blank check" preferred provision authorizing the
board to set the terms of the voting rights).
Although the preferred shareholders would be entitled to cumulative arrearages, such arrearages are vulnerable and can be eliminated
through mergers and other well-known techniques. 10 6 Thus, to protect
this right to cumulative dividends, it would be appropriate to give the
preferred an additional voting right: the right to elect as a class some
additional percentage of the directors each year that their dividend is
omitted. The right to such class voting would end once the arrearages
were fully paid. On this basis, control of the corporation might pass to
105. Many public corporations may have sufficiently broad "blank check" preferred
stock clauses in their corporate certificates of incorporation that they could accommodate
such a class voting system without amendment of the certificate. Under the law of most
major jurisdictions of incorporation, such a provision may permissibly authorize the board
of directors to set the terms, including the dividend rate, voting rights, and other features
of new classes of preferred issued from time to time. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151 (g)
(2001); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 402(a) (6), 502(c) (McKinney 2003). These provisions have
only been successfully challenged when used to create a class of stock that precludes a
hostile takeover. See Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
407, 408-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (enjoining "blank check" preferred class that had 25 votes per
share).
106. For example, cumulative arrearages can be easily eliminated through a merger
with the corporation's wholly owned subsidiary. E.g., Fed. United Corp. v. Havender, 11
A.2d 331 (Del. 1940); McNulty v. W. &J. Sloane, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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the preferred shareholders within two or three years if the arrearages
were not eliminated.
Finally, the contingent capital would have to be issued by the parent
holding company, not by the banking subsidiary, as voting rights would
have little meaning at a controlled subsidiary.
4. Amount to Be Issued. - How much contingent capital should a systematically significant financial institution be required to issue? The prudent answer to this question has to be determined not by reference to the
institution's long-term liabilities (e.g., other bonds and notes), but in
terms of its short-term liabilities (e.g., repos and other short-term borrowings, including guarantees that are off the balance sheet). 10 7 A primary
purpose of contingent capital is to prevent panic and dissuade these
short-term creditors from refusing to roll over their debt obligations because of a fear of insolvency. Thus, the principal amount of the contingent capital that will convert must be sufficient to alleviate those concerns. In practical terms, one implication of this point is that federal
regulators may need to negotiate the required amount of contingent capital, either on a case-by-case basis or through regulations that require the
amount of contingent capital to be issued to equal or exceed some percentage of short-term debt.
Some may feel that a very large issuance of preferred stock would
give the financial institution a "top heavy" capital structure. This is debatable, because nonpayment of a preferred stock dividend can never cause
default or insolvency. Still, an incremental conversion design avoids any
"day to night" change in capital structure and gives the financial institution the opportunity to issue additional common stock. Finally, if it were
generally perceived as undesirable for the number of preferred shares
outstanding to exceed the number of common shares, then, under the
earlier proposed design, under which conversions would occur after 25%,
50%, and 75% stock drops, the final conversion could be to common
stock.
One inevitable limitation on contingent capital must be acknowledged: Ultimately, it cannot prevent economic failure. Interest and
amortization on bonds are fixed costs, which do not affect the decision
whether to continue the firm in business. That decision is only rationally
based on the firm's ability to recover its variable costs. If a firm's variable
costs clearly exceed its revenues, and no turnaround is in sight, the firm
will not be saved by converting its bonds into preferred stock. At such a
point, resolution authority provides the superior mechanism for its liquidation. Thus, the boundaries within which contingent capital can feasibly work are set by the firm's ability to recover its variable costs.
107. "Short-term liabilities," as used here, would not include depositors, who arguably
are less likely to panic because of the presence of FDIC deposit insurance, but would
include repos and the debt issued by SIVs.
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C. Potential Objections and Implementation Concerns
Some objections are foreseeable, and some uncertainties clearly exist. These are briefly discussed below.
1. If the Goal Is to Avert Bankruptcy, Why Not Just Require More Common
Stock to Be Issued? - Skeptics have argued that it is simpler to mandate
higher capital reserves than to use contingent capital.10 8 They have suggested that issuers resist equity issuances because common stock is perceived by the industry as "too expensive." But avoidance of bankruptcy is
not the only goal; another goal is to reduce shareholder pressure on management for acceptance of greater risk. Even if avoidance of bankruptcy
were the only goal, the sale of equity securities by a financially distressed
issuer can be extremely difficult and may be feasible only at extreme discounts. These expected discounts may deter management from making
stock issuances that would be in the interest of the taxpaying public,
which bears the cost of bailouts. Finally, even if these critics are correct,
their argument acknowledges that the industry will resist mandatory issuances of common stock. Given that resistance, use of a convertible preferred may encounter less resistance.
2. If the Goal Is to Give Voting Rights to Creditors, Why Not Just Authorize
Bondholders to Vote? - Actually, the corporate law of most jurisdictions
does not authorize voting by bondholders to elect the board of directors.
Delaware, which permits the certificate of incorporation to authorize voting by bondholders, is the leading exception.109 But the policy goal here
is both to avoid default and bankruptcy as well as to create a new voting
constituency. Those goals could not be fully realized if we simply gave
bondholders voting rights to elect directors in limited circumstances (for
example, based on ratings downgrades to below investment grade or
other financial tests). Although such a voting power might reduce stockholder pressure, the prospect of default and a destabilizing bankruptcy
would remain if the bonds did not convert into equity. Contingent capital thus achieves two objectives at once: (1) avoidance of default, and (2)
alteration of voting power to give creditors a voice in corporate governance. In addition, limiting the voting rights to the preferred stock effectively restricts the creditors' voice to times when the corporation is in
financial distress. This minimizes the natural conflict between bondholders and shareholders over issues of risk and uses the preferred stock as a
late-stage failsafe device.

108. E.g., Admati et al., supra note 9, at 5-6.
109. Section 221 ("Voting, Inspection and Other Rights of Bondholders and
Debenture Holders") authorizes certificate of incorporation provisions permitting
bondholders to vote. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 221 (2001). Few other jurisdictions follow
Delaware in this regard.
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In general, corporate law scholars have assumed that only shareholders should vote because they are the residual claimants on the firm.1 10
But as the corporation becomes insolvent, the board of directors' fiduciary obligation shifts from shareholders to creditors.11 1 Chancellor Allen
of the Delaware Chancery Court thus once famously suggested that in the
"vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the
12
residual risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise."'
Although Delaware has not pursued this idea (and indeed may have
backed off of it),1 13 the "vicinity of insolvency" context remains highly
problematic because shareholders do have rational incentives to accept
very high risk at this stage. Instead of an "all or nothing" rule that
switches the board's fiduciary duty from shareholders to creditors at an
imprecisely defined moment, the foregoing proposal designs a compromise mechanism that provides a voice to creditors once in that "vicinity,"
but still leads to fewer legal uncertainties.
3. Will Tax Law Recognize Contingent Capital as Debt Wen It May Be
Converted to Equity? - The short answer is yes, if some constraints are
observed. Although the Internal Revenue Code eyes suspiciously debt instruments that have an "equity flavor,"' 14 the key point here is that, as of
110. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
J.L. & Econ. 395, 403-04 (1983) ("As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the
group with the appropriate incentives ... to make discretionary decisions.").
111. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 790 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); accord FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973,
976-77 (4th Cir. 1982); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981). For an
overview, see Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers' Fiduciary
Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J.
Corp. L. 491, 500-06 (2007); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate
Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1510-23
(1993).
112. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, NV, 1991 WL 277613, at *34.
113. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
101 (Del. 2007) (rejecting claim for breach of fiduciary duty to creditor while corporation
was "operating in the zone of insolvency").
114. New financial products have placed the distinction between debt and equity
under increasing strain. The Internal Revenue Service responded to this problem in
Notice 94-47, which advised that the Service will "scrutinize" instruments that are designed
to be treated as debt for tax purposes but as equity for regulatory purposes. I.R.S. Notice
94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357. At present, contingent capital does not count as Tier 1 equity for
bank regulatory purposes (although banks would certainly want it to so qualify). The IRS
further warned in Notice 94-47 that instruments that are characterized as notes, "but that,
on balance, are more equity-like are unlikely to qualify as debt for federal income tax
purposes." Id. That Notice listed those factors that the IRS considers suspicious, including
'whether the rights of the holders of the instruments are subordinate to rights of general
creditors" and "whether the instruments give the holders the right to participate in the
management of the issuer." Id. In truth, contingent capital can have these outcomes-but
only once a conversion is triggered. For a recent review of the IRS's positions in this area,
see Grace Soyon Lee, What's in a Name?: The Role of Danielsonin the Taxation of Credit
Card Securitizations, 62 Baylor L. Rev. 110, 126-28 (2010).
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the bonds' issuance, neither the issuer nor the shareholders want the
mandatory conversion to be triggered. Such a trigger comes into play
only when there is a substantial decrease in the price of the common stock
(or a similar increase in credit default swap spreads), and thus contingent
capital is very different from a subordinated convertible debenture
(which will be converted to common stock when there is an increasein the
stock price). Moreover, in many of the instances in which the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) believes that debt should be recharacterized as
equity, it is relying on the factor that "there is identity between holders of
the instruments and stockholders of the issuer." 1 5 That is not the case
with respect to contingent capital, where the purchasers of contingent
capital securities would be traditional debt investors.
The bottom line is that even if some less-than-careful attempts to issue contingent capital could raise issues under the Internal Revenue
Code, more prudent tax planning can assure that bonds that are contingently convertible into senior preferred stock will still be considered debt
during the period prior to any such conversion. Probably, the factor that
will receive the greatest attention from the IRS is the term of the debt
security. The shorter the term, the more likely that the IRS will accept a
debt characterization (as the prospect of conversion is reduced). Suppose then that a ten-year term is used. On maturity, the issuer can be
required to replace the old issuance of contingent capital with a new issuance. Such a cycle of reissuances should satisfy the formalism of tax law.
4. Will Investors Buy Contingent Capital? - Some have expressed
doubt that contingent capital can be sold to wary investors. 1 6 Still, since
the 2008 crisis, several offerings of contingent capital have been successfully completed,1 17 and Credit Suisse has announced its intention to mar115. I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357 (listing this as sixth of eight factors); see also
Monon R.R. v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 345, 359-62 (1970) (holding 6% income debentures
issued by railway to retire Class A stock "are in substance debt," despite fifty-year term and
condition that interest was payable only out of available net income), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 3.
The key features that led the Service to challenge (unsuccessfully) the debt character of
the financial instrument in Monon Railroad was the fifty-year term of the bonds and the fact
that interest was payable only out of earnings. Few debt securities issued by publicly held
financial institutions are likely to approach this term or to have such an "income"
precondition to the payment of interest.
116. See, e.g., Sara Schaefer Mufioz, A Hard Road for 'Coco' Debt, Wall St. J., Oct. 15,
2010, at C3 (noting "U.K. banks and investors . . . remain wary" about purchasing
contingent capital instruments); Philip Aldrick, 'Cocos' Could Destabilize Recovery, ABI
Warns, Daily Telegraph (London), Jan. 12, 2011, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
newsbysector/banksandfinance/8253553/Cocos-could-destabilise-recovery-ABI-warns.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (warning institutions have a "limited appetite" for
contingent capital); see also Who Will Buy CoCos?, supra note 29 (discussing S&P report
expressing doubts as to marketability of contingent capital). These doubts as to
marketability were, however, expressed about bonds that convert into common stock, not
bonds that will receive a higher fixed return as preferred stock after conversion (as
proposed here).
117. The two most noteworthy offerings were by Lloyds Bank and Rabobank in 2010.
Bowman, supra note 99, at 92, 94; Rabo Sets Tongues Wagging with SCN Issue, EuroWeek,
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ket a series of such offerings.1 18 Although these transactions show that
such offerings can be done,11 9 they hardly demonstrate that investors
have definitively accepted this new product.
Three factors have chilled investors' enthusiasm to date. First, the
ratings agencies have been unwilling to give an investment grade rating
to, and reluctant even to rate, a debt security that may convert into an
equity security.12 0 Second, investors could read an individual financial
institution's decision to issue contingent capital as a signal that it had
private knowledge that it was approaching the "vicinity of insolvency."
Third, some fixed income investors are simply not legally permitted to
hold common shares.
None of these obstacles, however, should prove fatal to contingent
capital's use. Rating agency reluctance to rate contingent capital securi-

Mar. 19, 2010 [hereinafter EuroWeek, Rabo]. These two transactions used similar
formulas to trigger conversion. In Lloyds' case, the conversion would be triggered when its
core tier one capital fell below 5%, while in the Rabobank offering, the conversion trigger
would be pulled if the bank's equity ratio fell below 7%. Bowman, supra note 99, at 95.
Nevertheless, both tests relied on regulatory requirements and accounting measurements,
not the more objective test of a stock price decline recommended here. Investors
expressed concern that such regulatory triggers were uncertain in their impact because the
formulas used to compute ratios and tier one capital could change over time.
Overall, it appears that $6 billion in "reverse convertible" bonds were issued by banks
in 2010. See Faux, supra note 29. Although investors appear to have initially lost money
on these bonds when stock prices rose, id., this means only that a higher return may need
to be paid in future offerings.
118. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
119. It is also noteworthy that the Lloyds Bank and Rabobank offerings involved very
different issuers in terms of creditworthiness. In the Lloyds transaction, the contingent
bonds were issued in exchange for existing bonds that Lloyds was unlikely to be able to
repay. Hence, the existing bondholders had a stark choice: accept the exchange or expect
default. In contrast, Rabobank had a triple-A rating, and observers report that Rabobank
was able to market the deal with relative ease because investors saw little prospect that the
trigger would ever be pulled. Bowman, supra note 99, at 94.
The contingent bonds marketed by Rabobank provided that if Rabobank's equity ratio
fell below 7%, the senior bondholders would "automatically take a 75% write-down."
EuroWeek, Rabo, supra note 117. This implies an immediate gain for the equity when
(and if) this trigger is pulled. Although that prospect was deemed very remote in the
Rabobank offering, this seems exactly the wrong formula to use and one that may
encourage opportunistic behavior by management.
120. Moody's, for example, refused even to rate the Rabobank deal, stating: "We have
opted not to rate newly issued contingent capital securities with regulatory capital triggers
for the time being." EuroWeek, Rabo, supra note 117. Despite the lack of any rating, the
deal received a "strong response" and was fully sold out, according to Morgan Stanley, the
placement agent for the deal. Fitch, however, has recently indicated its willingness to rate
contingent capital. See EuroWeek, High Hopes, supra note 23 (reporting Fitch's
announcement it would rate contingent capital and describing its methodology for doing
so). Standard & Poor's has also published a report predicting that $1 trillion in contingent
convertible debt will be issued by banks within the next five to ten years, suggesting that it
sees this new asset class as viable. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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ties appears to be a transitional problem. 121 In all likelihood, if such capital were mandated by regulators (as the Swiss have already done), it
would appear less novel or suspicious to investors and ratings agencies.
Also, the legal need for institutions to receive investment grade ratings
from ratings agencies as a precondition to debt purchases has been
largely curtailed by the Dodd-Frank Act, which deleted most federal statutory references requiring such ratings.' 22 Investor fears about private
knowledge on the part of the issuer would also be reduced if the issuer
had little choice because of regulatory requirements. In that case, the
issuer's decision to issue contingent capital would not resemble a market
signal. Next, even if some investors cannot hold common shares, they
can sell their contingent bonds prior to their conversion. This supplies
an additional reason why the pricing formula should not require any
writedown at the time of conversion, in order to make it easier for such
bonds to trade smoothly.
Finally, and most importantly, investors who cannot hold common
stock (either for legal or economic reasons) may be both able and more
willing to hold a nonconvertible, cumulative preferred stock. Indeed, because of institutional style and risk preferences, such investors may much
prefer to hold a senior preferred stock, rather than a common stock, if
their bonds must be converted. The fear of many investors is likely to be
that they will be converted into the common stock of a sinking ship-i.e.,
a financial Titanic that has already hit the iceberg. But this fear is at least
mitigated if the conversion is not to equity (and hence the bottom of the
ladder in bankruptcy) but to an intermediate senior security that would
actually pay a higher fixed return than the bonds that are converted. For
this reason alone, the conversion should be to a senior security to facilitate the sale of the original bonds.
Of course, some institutional investors may still insist on investment
grade ratings, either because they do rely on the ratings agencies or because their boards are concerned about their potential liability under
common law fiduciary standards, which require them to meet the standards of a "prudent man." But in an increasingly competitive ratings
marketplace, ratings agencies are unlikely to turn down opportunities to
rate debt securities, particularly if contingent convertibles become a
121. Fitch's announcement that it would rate contingent capital seems important
evidence of this transition. See supra note 120. Similarly, Standard & Poor's prediction of
very large contingent capital issuances in the near future suggests which way it sees the
wind to be blowing. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
122. Section 939 ("Removal of Statutory References to Credit Ratings") of the DoddFrank Act strikes references requiring specified credit ratings from several federal statutes,
including the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and
the Securities Exchange Act. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376,
1885-87 (2010) (amending various sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). Nonetheless,
most institutional investors will predictably want investment grade ratings, both because
they are risk averse and because they will want to protect their directors or trustees from
liability for breach of their fiduciary duties as prudent trustees.
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more prevalent asset class. Particularly when the convertible security will
receive an improved rate of return on conversion (as proposed here),
rating agencies may accept that this protection allows them to consider
such a security "investment grade" (albeit at a low level).
5. How Will the Market Respond to a Debenture Convertible into Preferred

Stock? - Convertible debt is a well-recognized security that over the last
thirty years has constituted approximately 10% of total securities issuances by all U.S. corporations. 123 Typically, convertible debt offers the
investor a two-way play: a straight debt security plus an option feature
that offers equity appreciation through conversion. This Article's proposal, in contrast, does not include this option-like element, as the debt
converts only into a fixed return preferred stock (which offers little hope
of equity appreciation) and conversion is not at the option of the holder.
In all likelihood, this means that a major class of the investors who buy
convertible securities-arbitrage and hedge funds-will not be interested
in such a security. Still, although arbitrage funds began to dominate the
convertible debt market in the 1990s, 124 their participation has fallen in
this sector since the 2008 crisis (as their ability to hedge has been constrained).1 25 At the same time, during the financial crisis, many cash- and
credit-constrained firms apparently found issuing convertibles to "have
been the only option."1 26 Thus, since 2008, convertible securities have
been primarily issued by financially strained companies to longer-term
investors who were not seeking to arbitrage. 127 On this basis, contingent

convertible securities may be attractive to many traditional debt investors
because they offer the higher debt return of subordinated debt plus an
even higher dividend return following any conversion.
Even if the demand side would be willing to buy a security that converted into a fixed return preferred stock, the supply side (i.e., issuers)
may have a different view. Issuers know that preferred stock is not tax
advantaged, because they cannot deduct their dividend payments on such
a security from their revenues (as they can in the case of a debt security).
Normally, this might be a serious disincentive to its use. But a "contingent capital" security converts only when the firm is in distress. At this
point, the interest deduction is likely to be less important because the
123. Eric Duca et al., Why Are Convertible Bond Announcements Associated with
Increasingly Negative Abnormal Stock Returns? An Arbitrage-Based Explanation I (Sept.
13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681392 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
124. See Darwin Choi et al., Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Liquidity Externalities, and
Stock Prices, 91J. Fin. Econ. 227, 227 (2009) (noting "widespread belief among Wall Street
practitioners... that convertible bond arbitrage hedge funds purchase 70% to 80% of the
convertible debt offered in primary markets"). These investors typically buy the
underpriced convertible security and short the common stock-a hedging strategy unlikely
to work where the preferred stock has little potential for upside appreciation.
125. Duca et al., supra note 123, at 3.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id. at 3.
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firm is typically in a loss position (and thus cannot easily use the tax deduction). Moreover, at this point, the fact that the nonpayment of the
dividend does not create a default is likely to be reassuring to the firm's
management. Hence, although uncertainty remains, it is plausible that
both the demand and the supply side would see such a security as attractive, even in the absence of any potential for equity appreciation.
Finally, if financial regulators require it, and large financial issuers
must sell it, underwriters can be counted on to make a virtue out of necessity and market it vigorously.
6. Would Management Resist Contingent Capital?- Corporate managers are not known for welcoming ideas conceived by academics and imposed by regulators. Still, hostility to contingent capital should not be
assumed. Outside the United States, some banks have already issued
such securities, and others are likely to do so soon. But, more importantly, if a CEO of a major financial institution were faced with a proxy
challenge (presumably pursuant to new SEC Rule 14a-11) led by activist
shareholders seeking representation on his board, this CEO might find
much to like about the idea of a significant voting block of preferred
shareholders, whose rational incentive would be to resist increased risk.
7. Can Conversion Be Called Off? - As earlier discussed, a key problem with resolution authority is that regulators may fear the political
repercussions of placing a major financial institution into liquidation.
Correspondingly, a potential problem with contingent capital is that an
approaching conversion might be postponed or even cancelled. This
could occur either if the issuer could redeem or amend the bonds (possibly by means of a waiver provision permitting a delay in their conversion
that was set forth in the bond indenture) or if it could conduct a debt
tender offer that exchanged new, nonconvertible debt securities at a premium for the outstanding debt securities. An issuer might justify such a
tactic on the grounds that extrinsic market developments had caused its
stock price to decline and conversion would severely dilute its
stockholders.
Such a scenario makes the case for an incremental conversion design. If conversion occurs on a piecemeal basis (say, 25% at each point in
a series of stock price declines), then the issuer's management will have
less reason to seek to cancel or delay the conversion feature. Nonetheless, a "contingent capital standard" (as it might be adopted by the FRB)
should preclude post-issuance amendments or delays. To the extent that
extrinsic market developments may trigger conversion, this problem is
better addressed through a dual price trigger that requires an industry
stock index to decline relative to the market as a whole before conversion
is triggered.
Managers might also wish to make the preferred stock issued on conversion redeemable (in order to maximize their flexibility), but here
again a conflict arises between their preferences and the desire of regulators to avoid sudden increases in leverage. As proposed here, the cumu-
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lative preferred should not be redeemable. Of course, an issuer can repurchase stock in the market or tender for it, but such a major attempt to
alter its balance sheet should come within the jurisdiction of the appropriate bank regulatory agency. As a guideline, if the major ratings agencies would not reduce their ratings on the issuer's debt as a result of such
a repurchase of the preferred stock, then such repurchases seem
acceptable.
8. Can Contingent CapitalBe Manipulated? - Concern has been expressed that at least some designs for contingent capital may have multiple equilibria and that this indeterminacy facilitates market manipulation.1 28 One such scenario might be that arbitrageurs collude to drive
the market price of the common stock below the trigger price at which
conversion becomes mandatory. Depending on the facts, this could either benefit the holders of the contingent capital security (if the common
stock were to be significantly diluted and the conversion was at an unduly
discounted price) or the common stock holders (if the contingent capital
were converted to common stock at a price that was below the market
value of the debt security).
Two brief responses to this market manipulation scenario should be
sufficient. First, if the contingent capital employed a dual price trigger,
manipulation becomes an exceedingly remote possibility. Under a dual
price trigger, conversion would occur only if (1) the company's own stock
price fell the requisite percentage, and (2) a stock index of similar financial institutions declined in relation to the general stock market by a defined percentage. While it may be possible to force the price of a single
company down sufficiently to trigger conversion, it is a far more forbidding challenge to manipulate the stock price level of the entire financial
industry.129

Second, even if market manipulation might be a rational strategy for
arbitrageurs in the case of a debt security that converted into common
stock, there would be far less incentive to attempt manipulation when the
debt security converted into a preferred stock. The common stock might
be volatile, and the arbitrageurs might hope that it would rebound in
value after the price decline and conversion that they caused. But such a
rebound is far less likely in the case of a senior security, which should stay
reasonably aligned in value with the debt security.
128. See generally Sundaresan & Wang, supra note 95. Sundaresan and Wang focus
only on a debt security that converts into common stock (and not into a senior security).
See id. at 4. Some of their discussion also contemplates that conversion is at the option of
the debt holder.
129. Some commentators doubt that any manipulation can be maintained for any
sustained period in an efficient market. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the
Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in Financial Markets?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 503, 512-19 (1991).
A manipulation campaign among colluding arbitrageurs that would be strong enough to
cause a large financial institution's stock price to fall 25% or more (and remain at that
level for several days to trigger conversion) seems particularly implausible.
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The bottom line then is that the possibility of market manipulation
can be easily dealt with. Although some price indeterminacy might be
associated with contingent capital, that prospect also largely fades when
the debt security converts only into a preferred stock with a relatively similar return.
9. Are There Any Legal Preconditionsto the Issuance of Contingent Capital?
- As noted above, the issuer's certificate of incorporation must authorize any class of stock and define its rights. But this authorization can be
implicit, as "blank check" preferred provisions are authorized by most
corporation statutes and delegate to the board the actual determination
130
of the rights, including voting and dividend rights, of any new class.
Such provisions are extremely common today.13 1 Still, in the unusual
case where no such provision exists, an amendment to the certification of
incorporation would be necessary, and this in turn raises the question:
Would shareholders approve such a provision?
The most likely answer is that shareholders could be given little
choice. Bank regulators can simply require a large financial institution to
opt between raising significant equity capital by a public offering or issuing debt with contingent capital provisions. Because the public offering
of common stock would be more dilutive (and in times of economic
stress might significantly reduce the stock's market price), shareholders
should logically prefer the contingent capital option. But this answer still
leaves open whether regulators have the determination to force such a
choice on systemically significant financial institutions.
D. Regulatory Authority: How Should Regulators Implement Contingent
Capital?
Regulatory authority to require contingent capital is the one issue on
which little doubt exists. The Dodd-Frank Act clearly authorizes financial
regulators to impose "a contingent capital requirement" on both "nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors" and certain "bank holding companies."1 3 2 Under section 165(b) (1) (A) of the
130. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
131. In a recent study of initial public offerings (or IPOs), Professor John Coates
found that 86% of the IPOs in his survey had charters authorizing "blank check" preferred.
See John B. Coates, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89
Calif. L. Rev. 1301, 1357 (2001). Similarly, Professors Daines and Klausner of Stanford
report that "blank check" preferred was authorized in 95% of IPOs between 1994 and
1997. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17J.L. Econ. & Org. 83, 96 tbl.2 (2001). Although these
surveys are of recent IPOs, Professor Coates also notes that Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) data, as of December 31, 1998, showed that "more than 90% of
public companies have adopted charter provisions giving boards 'blank check' authority to
issue preferred stock as needed without further shareholder approval." Coates, supra, at
1398.
132. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1424 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). This is a permissive power, which authorizes the Board of

2011]

SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION

Dodd-Frank Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is directed to adopt certain mandatory "prudential standards" dealing with
specified topics, 13 3 and then under section 165(b) (1) (B), it is permitted
to specify certain "additional standards," including with respect to "a contingent capital requirement." 13 4 Following the completion of a study of
contingent capital by the FSOC, 1 35 the Board of Governors is further authorized by section 165 (c) ("Contingent Capital") of the Dodd-Frank Act
to issue "regulations that require each nonbank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding companies [with total
assets over $50 billion] to maintain a minimum amount of contingent
capital that is convertible to equity in times of financial stress." 136 Various
factors are specified that must be considered in adopting these regulations, including any recommendations made by the FSOC. 1 37 In short,
Dodd-Frank Act makes contingent capital an option and not a mandate,
but it discusses it repeatedly.
In all likelihood, the Federal Reserve will not take any dispositive
action until Congress receives the FSOC's report in 2012. In the
meantime, the financial industry will consider its position. For the industry, an important question will likely be whether contingent capital can
qualify as Tier One capital that counts against the Basel III minimum
standards for major banks. An obvious alternative position would be to
follow the Swiss approach and require contingent capital to supplement
Governors of the Federal Reserve to establish a "prudential standard" with regard to
contingent capital, but does not impose a mandatory requirement. In the case of bank
holding companies, the institution must have total consolidated assets "equal to or greater
than $50,000,000,000." Id. § 165(a)(1). In the case of "nonbank financial companies," the
Federal Reserve must have first determined to exercise supervision over the institution
because of its potential systemic significance. Obviously, the Federal Reserve will do this
only in a few cases.
133. For example, section 165(b) (1) (A) expressly lists "liquidity requirements,"
.overall risk management requirements," "resolution plan and credit exposure report
requirements," and "concentration limits." Id. § 165(b) (1) (A) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5365).
134. Other topics that the Board of Governors could similarly subject to an
"additional prudential standard[ ]" include "enhanced public disclosures" and "short-term
debt limits." Id. § 165(b)(1)(B) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
135. Under section 115(c), the FSOC is instructed to conduct and submit a report to
Congress on the "feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure of a contingent capital
requirement." This report is to be submitted not later than two years after the Dodd-Frank
Act's date of enactment-or July 21, 2012 (as Dodd-Frank Act's date of enactment was July
21, 2010). Id. § 115(c)(1)-(2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325). Based on this report,
the FSOC may make a recommendation to the Federal Reserve Board as to the "minimum
amount of contingent capital" that should be maintained. Id. § 115(c) (3) (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5325).
136. Id. § 165(c)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). On the face of the statute,
the FSOC's report does not control the Federal Reserve's discretion, but its completion
and submission to Congress are procedural prerequisites under section 165(c).
137. Id. § 165(c) (2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). The first factor so listed is
"the results of the study undertaken by the [FSOC] and any recommendations made by the
[FSOC]." Id.
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the minimum required equity under Basel 111.138 To be sure, Switzerland
is distinctive in that it, possibly alone, faces the prospect of banks that are
"too big to be saved." 139 But counting contingent capital as Tier One
capital might allow banks to operate with a 100:1 debt-to-equity ratio.
What compromise makes sense? From this Article's perspective, the
appropriate minimum level for contingent capital should be determined
with reference to the financial institution's short-term liabilities, because
a recurrent cause of collapse at financial institutions has been that shortterm lenders suddenly back away as they sense a possible failure (which is
how they behaved in the cases of Lehman and Bear Stearns). 40 The goal
must be to assure these creditors that conversion protects them from the
risk of default. Thus, rather than follow the Swiss approach, which adds
across the board a mandatory 9% second tier of contingent capital on top
of Tier One capital, the amount of contingent capital required might
properly vary with the level of the company's short-term liabilities (computed on an average outstanding basis). That should reduce the potential for panic.
The most important issues relating to the use of contingent capital
involve whether it should be used proactively to deter excessive risk-taking or only as a twelfth hour substitute for bankruptcy and liquidation.
Opting for the former approach, this Article has advocated the use of an
early trigger and partial, incremental conversions to a senior security.
The financial industry, however, will likely prefer a delayed trigger so that
the debt only converts on the doorsteps of bankruptcy. From the industry's perspective, if bankruptcy is inevitable, contingent capital simply implements a close equivalent to a prepackaged bankruptcy, but does not
otherwise interfere with issuers' operations (and also gives them the tax
advantages of debt capital). This Article has two objections to such a minimalist use of contingent capital. First, a single all-or-nothing conversion
will likely produce pressure for delay and modification (much as "orderly
liquidation" pursuant to resolution authority will also be resisted). Second, delaying conversion until the twelfth hour abandons the possibility
of deterring risk taking through an earlier trigger.
Nonetheless, at this point, politics rears its ugly head. Even if the
attitude of the still-embryonic FSOC on this issue cannot be anticipated,
the Federal Reserve has shown a marked tendency to align itself with the
industry's perspective and preferences.' 4 1 Similarly, the use of a voting
138. Under the Swiss rules, a major bank must have Tier One capital equal to 10% of
its risk-adjusted assets (whereas Basel III requires only 7%), and must issue an additional
9% in contingent capital. First Mover, supra note 23.
139. See supra note 23.
140. See Gorton, Invisible Hand, supra note 65, at 15-23 (detailing history of banking
panics)
141. The Federal Reserve is often described as autonomous, technocratic,
nonpartisan, somewhat elitist in style, and politically unaccountable. Commentators from
Congressman Ron Paul on the right to Senator Bernard Sanders on the left regularly echo
this theme of its alleged lack of accountability. For representative critiques, see generally
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preferred stock may be too novel an idea for the traditionalist Federal
Reserve. In short, the danger is that the potential of contingent capital
will not be seriously considered, as the industry and regulators quietly
agree to treat it only as a substitute for an insolvency reorganization. If
nothing more is done than to authorize a twelfth-hour conversion of debt
to equity, that minimalist response will both evidence the subservience of
the Federal Reserve to the financial industry and forfeit a promising opportunity to reduce the potential for a systemic risk crisis. Time will tell.
In one last, important respect, the implementation of contingent
capital should move beyond the Dodd-Frank Act's contemplated use of it.
As the Dodd-Frank Act recognizes, clearinghouses need to play a central
role in the over-the-counter derivatives markets if a future AG-like failure
is to be averted. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act recognizes that clearinghouses may attain "systemic importance," 14 2 but, once again, the DoddFrank Act, fearing bailouts, restricts the Federal Reserve Board's authority
to lend to them. 143 Few scenarios for financial destabilization are more
frightening (or more plausible) than the prospect of a clearinghouse's
failure. 144 Thus, if clearinghouse bailouts are discouraged or made politically too costly, the best remaining alternative is the mandatory use of
contingent capital in the capital structure of all major clearinghouses
(and probably also at the major securities and futures exchanges as well).
William Greider, Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country
(1987); Michael Wade Strong, Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A Monetarist Plan
for a More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 371 (2001). The
proper role of the Federal Reserve is beyond the scope of this Article. All that is asserted
here is that, in culture and style, the Federal Reserve tends to share the financial industry's
perspective, at least unless convinced that serious risks to the financial system are at stake.
For precisely this reason, Congress gave the new consumer protection agency created
within the Federal Reserve unique autonomy from its parent.
142. Section 804 ("Designation of Systemic Importance") authorizes the FSOC to
designate a "financial market utility" as "systemically important" and hence subject to
special oversight and regulation. Dodd-Frank Act § 804 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5463). Section 803(6) defines "financial market utility" to include clearinghouses and
other settlement systems. Id. § 803(6) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5462).
143. Section 806 ("Operation of Designated Financial Market Utilities") permits a
Federal Reserve Bank to provide "discount and borrowing privileges" to a "financial market
utility" (i.e., a clearinghouse) "only in unusual and exigent circumstances" and only after
(1) an affirmative vote by a majority of the Federal Reserve Board, (2) consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury, and (3) "a showing by the designated financial market utility
that it is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking
institutions." Id. § 806 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5465). These restrictions do not
wholly forbid loans, but restrict them tightly.
144. Clearinghouses have failed in the past, and some economists believe that
clearinghouses for over-the-counter swaps are particularly at risk of failure, because the
counterparties who clear through them will have significant informational advantages over
the clearinghouse. See Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, Reg., Winter 2008-2009,
at 44 (arguing OTC clearinghouses could increase systemic risk); Gretchen Morgenson,
Safety Net Encourages Bad Risks, Int'l Herald Trib., Oct. 4, 2010, at 20 ("[Clearinghouses]
are big, interconnected and they can fail when we have big market shocks." (quoting Craig
Pirrong)).
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However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not confer authority on the Federal
Reserve to require the use of contingent capital at clearinghouses or exchanges. 145 This is a dangerous and inconsistent omission. Prudent regulation, standing alone, will not prevent an eventual clearinghouse failure, and a failsafe strategy is thus needed.
CONCLUSION
Contingent capital is an idea whose time is coming-both within the
United States and internationally. Its special virtue is that it responds to
the problem of high risk-correlation among major financial institutions
without relying on the ability of regulators to always make wise and farsighted decisions in politically heated crises. Although use of contingent
capital may be costly, this cost is another way to tax the externality that
arises when creditors come to believe that some financial institutions are
"too big to fail."1 46
For the immediate future, contingent capital will likely be initially
tested in Europe. 14 7 This may reflect the more leveraged character of
145. The FSOC's and the Federal Reserve Board's authority to require contingent
capital derive from sections 115(c) and 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which basically
authorize enhanced supervision of "nonbank financial companies." Dodd-Frank Act
§§ 115(c), 165 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5365). Section 102(a) (4) defines the
term "nonbank financial company" to exclude a "national securities exchange," a "clearing
agency," a "securities-based swap execution facility," and a "derivatives clearing
organization" from this definition, thereby denying the Federal Reserve Board power over
them under section 165. Id. §§ 102(a) (4), 165 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5365).
Under section 805 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve Board is given broad
authority to "prescribe risk management standards" for "systemically important financial
market utilities" (which includes a clearinghouse), but this authority would not seem to
include power to impose a "contingent capital standard" (particularly because section 165
was very explicit in authorizing contingent capital with respect to "nonbank financial
companies"). Id. § 805 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464). The Act confers additional
authority on both the SEC and the CFTC with respect to clearinghouses, but grants neither
agency any statutory authority to issue a contingent capital standard. Id. § 716 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 8305).
146. The riskier a financial institution is perceived by the market to be, the higher the
likely interest rate will need to be on its contingent capital debt. This at least loosely
adjusts the tax in a risk-adjusted fashion. In contrast, assessments charged to banks by a
private industry bailout fund are less likely to be objectively risk-adjusted.
147. The European Commission expects to soon publish a "consultation paper"
focusing on mandatory debt conversion into equity as a step towards enacting "a binding
law." Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, EU Plans for Bondholder Haircuts Unsettles Debt
Markets, Daily Telegraph (London), Jan. 5, 2011, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
financetopics/financiacrisis/8242275/EU-pans-for-bondholder-haircuts-unsettles-debtmarkets.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Ambrose Evans-Pritchard,
Europe Unveils Sweeping Plans to Govern Reckless Banks, Daily Telegraph (London),Jan.
6, 2011, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/8244160/
Europe-unveils-sweeping-plans-to-govern-reckless-banks.html
(on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing consultation paper). In addition, Switzerland has adopted higher
equity standards for banks than the EU, and Switzerland's standards require the use of
contingent capital. See supra note 23.

20111

SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION

some European banks, or the stricter capital standards of some European
countries, or possibly the disinclination of U.S. regulators (especially the
Federal Reserve) to impose a new and untested idea on U.S. financial
institutions. Yet, unlike many other potentially meritorious ideas that
would require legislation, the Federal Reserve Board already has the legal
authority to implement a "contingent capital requirement."' 4 8 Moreover,
because contingent capital is a concept that regulators are considering on
a worldwide basis, its adoption could avoid regulatory arbitrage and related problems that may undermine other sensible reforms.' 49 International convergence on such a reform is much more possible than on issues such as resolution authority or cross-border bankruptcy, where
individual nations have long, complex legal traditions and do not change
course easily.
Attractive as the concept of contingent capital is, the devil remains in
the details. This Article has proposed two design principles for a contingent capital standard for systemically significant financial institutions that
will be controversial: (1) incremental conversion in a series of steps
should be preferred over a massive, one-time conversion, and (2) shareholder pressure for short-term profit and higher leverage is best countered by giving the debt holders a limited right to vote in times of financial distress. Contingent capital can thus be designed to give us two
reforms in one package: a safer, less default-prone capital structure and a
counterweight to shareholder pressure.
More importantly, contingent capital is an illustration of a new kind
of regulatory strategy: an attempt to embed a market-based buffer into
the corporate governance of financial institutions in order to protect
against both industry capture of the regulator and the cognitive limitations of all market participants. While desirable, regulatory oversight will
inevitably be ad hoc, politically constrained, and inconsistent, and thus
needs to be supplemented by more objective and market-based standards. 150 To be sure, contingent capital is not a panacea, nor a substitute
for preventive regulation, but nothing is more certain than that regulators will again miss a crisis (or equivocate in the face of one). Contingent
capital offers a systemic shock absorber to mitigate that next predictable
failure.

148. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
149. For example, proposals for a bank levy to support a private insurance fund face
problems if some countries adopt such a proposal and others do not. Those nations that
do not tax their banks would become essentially free riders on the efforts of the other
nations, as the fund will presumably protect all creditors of the insured bank.
150. This Article has politely refrained from stressing the failures of Drexel Burnham,
Long-Term Capital Management, Bear Stearns, Lehman, Enron, WorldCom, or the SEC's
experience with Bernard Madoff. For a review of these failures, see Anabtawi & Schwarcz,
supra note 4. At a minimum, the burden of persuasion is on those who believe that the
Dodd-Frank Act will end future regulatory failures.

